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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to measure and compare unemployment insurance (UI) 
policies among different countries based on generosity and efficiency. A modified modeling 
framework from Pallage, Scruggs, and Zimmermann (2013) is utilized that excludes savings by 
agents but incorporates endogenous job search intensities.  
To measure UI generosity two models are created: 1) a simple model where everyone is 
eligible for UI and receives benefits indefinitely until re-employment; and 2) a complex model, 
based on realistic UI policy, which incorporates a waiting period, a UI entitlement status, benefit 
payments and durations, as well as social assistance policies. The models are calibrated to match 
an unemployment rate and a share of short-term unemployment of a specific country. The only 
difference between the two models is the UI policy in place. The generosity metric is then 
calculated as the replacement ratio in the simple model such that agents are indifferent between 
the simple UI scheme and the complex (realistic) UI policy. Alongside the generosity metric, an 
efficiency measure is created that measures the utility loss from moving from the benchmark UI 
system (offering optimum level of benefits) to the realistic UI system. The countries investigated 
are Canada, United States, France, and Germany post and pre Hartz reforms.  
The main results show that Germany pre-reform is the most generous system followed by 
USA, Germany post-reform, France, and Canada. Rankings based on efficiency display similar 
pattern. A welfare comparison between Germany pre and post Hartz reform showed that the 
reform reduced UI generosity, decreased UI efficiency, and caused welfare to either decline or 
slightly increase depending on the specified risk aversion coefficient. Finally, the sensitivity 
results reveal that USA is the least generous UI system when housing assistance is removed from 
the social assistance benefit calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, professor Andreas Pollak, for his 
guidance, support, and patience.  
Also I would like to give a special thanks to my fiancé Klaudia Sieminska for her love and 
support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my loving parents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................... i	  
DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................................. i	  
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii	  
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iv	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ v	  
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii	  
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix	  
1.	   INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1	  
2.	   LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 5	  
2.1.	   Measuring UI Generosity .................................................................................................. 5	  
2.2.	   Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann (PSZ) Generosity Measure ..................................... 12	  
3.	   COUNTRY OVERVIEWS: UI AND WELFARE POLICIES ............................................. 15	  
3.1.	   Canada ............................................................................................................................. 15	  
3.2.	   United States ................................................................................................................... 19	  
3.3.	   Germany .......................................................................................................................... 24	  
3.3.1.	   Germany Pre-Reform (2002) .................................................................................... 25	  
3.3.2.	   Germany Post-Reform (2013) .................................................................................. 29	  
3.4.	   France .............................................................................................................................. 33	  
3.5.	   Country Summaries ......................................................................................................... 37	  
4.	   MODELING STRATEGY .................................................................................................... 42	  
4.1.	   Model Foundation ........................................................................................................... 42	  
4.2.	   Simplistic UI System ....................................................................................................... 44	  
4.3.	   Complex UI Systems ....................................................................................................... 46	  
4.3.1.	   Canada ...................................................................................................................... 46	  
4.3.2.	   United States ............................................................................................................. 49	  
4.3.3.	   Germany (Pre-Reform) ............................................................................................. 52	  
4.3.4.	   Germany (Post-Reform) ........................................................................................... 54	  
4.3.5.	   France ....................................................................................................................... 56	  
5.	   MEASUREMENT STRATEGY ........................................................................................... 60	  
 vi 
5.1.	   Generosity Metric ............................................................................................................ 60	  
5.2.	   Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann (PSZ) Generosity Metric ........................................ 62	  
5.3.	   Efficiency Metric ............................................................................................................. 62	  
6.	   ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................ 64	  
6.1.	   Functional Form Assumptions ........................................................................................ 64	  
6.2.	   UI Policy Calibration ...................................................................................................... 65	  
6.3.	   Data ................................................................................................................................. 66	  
6.4.	   Numerical Solution Algorithm ........................................................................................ 68	  
6.5.	   Calibration ....................................................................................................................... 70	  
6.6.	   Results ............................................................................................................................. 78	  
6.7.	   PSZ Generosity Metric and OECD Replacement Ratio Comparisons ........................... 80	  
6.8.	   Germany Pre and Post Hartz Reforms: Welfare Comparisons ....................................... 82	  
6.9.	   Sensitivity Analysis ......................................................................................................... 83	  
6.9.1.	   Risk Aversion ........................................................................................................... 83	  
6.9.2.	   United States Model ................................................................................................. 86	  
7.	   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 90	  
7.1.	   Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 90	  
7.2.	   Policy ............................................................................................................................... 91	  
7.3.	   Limitations and Recommendations ................................................................................. 92	  
7.4.	   Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 93	  
DATA SOURCES ........................................................................................................................ 95	  
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 96	  
APPENDIX A – DATA ................................................................................................................ 99	  
APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL RESULTS .............................................................................. 103	  
APPENDIX C – ADDITIONAL TABLES ................................................................................ 118	  
 
  
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Comparable Replacement Ratios From OECD, CPB, and Group of Seven ................... 8	  
Table 3.1 EI Entrance Requirements ............................................................................................ 16	  
Table 3.2 EI Benefit Divisors ....................................................................................................... 18	  
Table 3.3 Ontario Works Monthly Maximum Allowances .......................................................... 19	  
Table 3.4 United States Overview of UI Program ........................................................................ 22	  
Table 3.5 SNAP Allowance and Eligibility Criteria ..................................................................... 24	  
Table 3.6 Germany (Pre-Reform) Unemployment Insurance Benefit Duration Calculations ...... 27	  
Table 3.7 Germany (Pre-Reform) Social Assistance Standard Benefit Amounts ........................ 28	  
Table 3.8 Germany (Pre-Reform) Estimated Monthly Housing and Heating Cost/Benefit ......... 29	  
Table 3.9 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit I Duration Calculations .................. 30	  
Table 3.10 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit II/Social Benefit Allowance ......... 32	  
Table 3.11 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit II/Social Benefit Housing 
Allowance ............................................................................................................................. 32	  
Table 3.12 Germany (Post-Reform) Reasonable Housing Size for Housing Allowance ............. 33	  
Table 3.13 France ARE Benefit Calculation ................................................................................ 34	  
Table 3.14 France ASS Benefit Amount for Single Person .......................................................... 35	  
Table 3.15 France ASS Benefit Amount for Couple/Household of Two ..................................... 36	  
Table 3.16 France ASS Benefit while Employed ......................................................................... 36	  
Table 3.17 France RSA Monthly Basic Allowance ...................................................................... 37	  
Table 3.18 France Monthly RSA Housing Allowance ................................................................. 37	  
Table 3.19 Country Unemployment Insurance Policy Overview ................................................. 40	  
Table 3.20 Country Unemployment Assistance Policy Overview ............................................... 41	  
Table 3.21 Country Social Assistance Policy Overview .............................................................. 41	  
Table 6.1 Adjusted Income and Benefits Used In Models (in 2010 Country Currency) .............. 68	  
Table 6.2 Calibration Targets ....................................................................................................... 70	  
 viii 
Table 6.3 Canada Calibrations Parameters and Results ................................................................ 71	  
Table 6.4 United States Calibrations Parameters and Results ...................................................... 73	  
Table 6.5 France Calibrations Parameters and Results ................................................................. 74	  
Table 6.6 Germany (Post-Reform) Calibrations Parameters and Results ..................................... 75	  
Table 6.7 Germany (Pre-Reform) Calibrations Parameters and Results ...................................... 77	  
Table 6.8 Generosity & Efficiency Metric Results ....................................................................... 79	  
Table 6.9 PSZ Metric and OECD Replacement Ratios ................................................................ 81	  
Table 6.10 Germany Pre and Post Reform: Common Parameters Results ................................... 82	  
Table 6.11 Generosity Metric for Different Risk Aversions ........................................................ 84	  
Table 6.12 Consumption Equivalent/Average Period Utility for Different Risk Aversions ........ 84	  
Table 6.13 Efficiency Metric for Different Risk Aversions ......................................................... 85	  
Table 6.14 United States Results with Different Policy and Assumptions (Risk Aversion=3) .... 86	  
Table 6.15 United States Results with Different Policy and Assumptions (Risk Aversion=1) .... 87	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Sargent Index for Canada’s EI System ........................................................................ 11	  
Figure 4.1 Simple UI Model Markov Process .............................................................................. 46	  
Figure 4.2 Canada Model Markov Process ................................................................................... 49	  
Figure 4.3 United States Model Markov Process ......................................................................... 51	  
Figure 4.4 Germany (Pre-Reform) Model Markov Process ......................................................... 54	  
Figure 4.5 Germany (Post-Reform) Model Markov Process ........................................................ 56	  
Figure 4.6 France Model Markov Process .................................................................................... 59	  
 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of unemployment insurance (UI) policies is to ease the transition from 
employment to unemployment in times of job loss or recessions. Internationally, these systems 
share some common elements such as offering benefits with limited duration and eligibly criteria, 
however, they each have their own unique program structure. The purpose of this thesis is to 
measure and compare UI policies among different countries based on generosity and efficiency. 
This task may seem straightforward, however one would have to account for many factors of UI 
policy other than benefit amounts. These factors can include benefit durations, strictness of UI 
qualifications, economic conditions (high or low unemployment), and what happens after 
benefits are exhausted (social assistance). 
Traditionally, UI generosity is measured by calculating a replacement ratio, which 
represents the portion of expected income received during unemployment relative to previous 
income. This measure is primarily used by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) to compare UI generosity among countries. However, there is no single 
replacement ratio; rather, there is a range of replacement ratios that correspond to employment 
history, prior income, age, and household composition. Replacement ratio calculations focus 
solely on benefits relative to income but fail to account for other important factors in regards to 
UI such as eligibility criteria, duration of benefits, and economic conditions. These other factors 
are important since UI policies differ; some UI programs may offer high benefits but have strict 
qualification criteria while others may offer low benefits but have lax qualifications criteria. A 
better measure of UI generosity should account for other factors of UI policy than just the 
benefits amounts relative to prior income.  
This thesis implements a modified methodology from Pallage, Scruggs, and 
Zimmermann (2013) to measure UI generosity and efficiency. Pallage et al. (2013) approach 
allows for modeling UI policy that incorporates a waiting period (if applicable), a minimum and 
maximum UI entitlement status, varying benefit payments and durations based on UI 
entitlement, as well as social assistance policies. The authors use a heterogeneous agents model 
with savings to generate a measure of UI generosity. To measure generosity for a single country, 
the authors construct two models. The first is a simple model where everyone is eligible for UI 
 2 
and receives benefits indefinitely until re-employment. The second is a model that contains all 
the relevant features of the UI policy such as a waiting period, qualification criteria, and a social 
assistance program for those who fail to qualify for UI, and et cetera. The only difference 
between the models is the UI policy in place. The models are calibrated to match the countries’ 
unemployment rate and average unemployment duration. Generosity is determined by the 
replacement ratio that makes agents indifferent between the simple UI policy model and the 
realistic UI model. This replacement ratio that makes the agents indifferent is the measure of UI 
generosity. Essentially, a replacement rate is found in the simple model such that it produces the 
same average utility as the realistic model.  
The methodology of this paper follows closely the work of Pallage et al. (2013) but with 
some modifications: a) savings by agent have been excluded from the model, and b) endogenous 
job search intensities are implemented into the model. A model with Bellman state equations is 
utilized to generate a measure of generosity and efficiency of a country’s UI system.  Pallage et 
al. (2013) match the simple UI policy model to the realistic UI model based on the criterion of 
average utility. The matching criterion in this paper uses the ratio of average utility of 
unemployment to employment, which measures consumption loss from moving from 
employment to unemployment. For better interpretation, utility will be converted to consumption 
equivalents; hence a consumption equivalent ratio will be used as the matching criterion. A 
replacement rate is found in the simple model such that it produces the consumption loss as the 
realistic model. Efficiency is also investigated: the realistic UI model is compared to a 
benchmark UI system where benefits offer the highest possible welfare. In terms of average 
utility, the efficiency metric measures the efficiency loss from moving from the benchmark UI 
system to the realistic UI system. 
The primary goal of this paper is to compare the UI policies of Canada, United States, 
France, and Germany in terms of generosity and efficiency, and to make welfare comparison pre 
and post Hartz reforms1 in Germany.  The secondary goal of this paper is to investigate whether 
the use of a different matching criterion, the ratio of utility of unemployment to employment, 
yields different results as opposed to using average utility. This is investigated because the ratio, 
                                                
1  The Hartz reforms made significant labour market changes in regards to the structure of UI 
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which measures the utility loss from moving from employment to unemployment, may be more 
relevant when it comes to UI generosity than using the average of utilities across all states.  
The paper is organized in the following order. Chapter 2 contains a literature review of 
studies measuring UI generosity. The chapter covers replacement ratio studies. Additionally, 
other measures are discussed such as index and model based measures. Further, the chapter 
explores in more detail the methodology and the results from the papers of Pallage et al. (2013) 
and Pallage, Scruggs, and Zimmermann (2008), who measure UI generosity using model-based 
approach. 
 Chapter 3 describes UI and other social insurance policies of Canada, United States, 
Germany and France using information from 2013. Germany is also summarized using 2002 
information so that a comparison can be made between Germany pre-Hartz reform and post-
Hartz reform. The country UI descriptions detail the eligibility criteria, benefit amount 
calculations, and benefit duration calculations. Similar descriptions are done for unemployment 
assistance programs, if applicable, and social assistance policies. The descriptions assume an 
individual of non-retirement age with no dependents or children. Therefore, any child benefits or 
family assistance programs are not considered. 
 Chapter 4 describes the modeling framework of this thesis that uses a simplified model 
by Pallage et al. (2013) but with an addition of endogenous job search intensities. The 
assumptions made in this thesis also simplify the Bellman equation used in Pallage et al. (2013) 
into a set of Bellman state equations, where each equation represents a possible state such as 
unemployment with UI benefits, employment with no UI coverage, et cetera. The chapter goes 
over the assumptions and specifications of the modeling framework and each country-specific 
model. 
 Chapter 5 describes the specifics of generosity and efficiency metrics used in this paper. 
Also, generosity measure from Pallage et al. (2013) is summarized. 
Chapter 6 details the results of the paper along with an overview of assumption on 
functional forms of the model and model parameters in regards to income, benefit amounts, 
eligibly criteria, unemployment rate, and share of short-term on unemployment. The analysis is 
divided into a calibration section, results, comparisons, and sensitivity analysis. The calibration 
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section outlines the results from the calibrated models followed by the UI generosity and 
efficiency metrics results. The generosity measure from Pallage et al. (2013) is re-created, using 
the modeling framework of this paper and it is compared to the main results. Additionally, 
comparisons are made against OECD generosity measures (net replacement ratios). Welfare 
comparisons of Germany pre and post-Hartz are also presented. Finally, sensitivity analysis is 
conducted using different risk aversion parameters and different USA policy/model assumptions 
to investigate their impact on the results. 
The conclusions are presented in Chapter 7, along with discussion and limitations of the 
paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Measuring UI Generosity 
Studies measuring UI generosity are divided into two main categories: replacement ratio 
measures focusing on a single dimension of UI (percent of expected unemployment income 
presented as a fraction of prior income); and, index based or multi-dimensional measures 
constructed to capture aspects of UI policies. Measures of UI generosity generally “consider the 
following elements of UI benefits: the legislated replacement rate, the percentage of the labour 
force covered by UI (coverage rate), the maximum number of benefit weeks for a minimally 
qualified claimant, and the minimum number of working weeks needed to qualify for UI” 
(Hornstein & Yuan, 1999) (p. 15). 
The majority of literature that measures UI generosity calculates a replacement ratio or a 
replacement rate defined as the ratio of expected income from unemployment benefits while 
unemployed (and other social benefits) to the expected income from work. This may seem like a 
relatively straightforward task, but as Martin (1996) points out: 
“There is no such thing as the replacement rate in any OECD country, rather there are a 
myriad of replacement rates corresponding to the specific personal and family 
characteristics of the unemployed, their previous history of work and unemployment, and 
the different structures and entitlements of unemployment insurance (UI) and social 
assistance (SA) systems in OECD countries and the ways in which these systems interact 
with tax systems. Once one tries to grapple with these complexities in order to compute 
replacement rates for the purpose of international comparisons, the task becomes a 
daunting one.” (p. 2) 
The replacement ratio only captures one aspect of an UI system; hence, the measure is only one-
dimensional. Other features, such as benefit duration and qualification criteria, are overlooked 
despite their influence on individual behaviour. The calculated replacement ratios serve as a 
metric for UI generosity, higher ratios implying higher generosity. 
An OECD research paper by Martin (1996) compares unemployment benefit entitlements 
in OECD countries by generating a set of gross and net replacement ratios.  The OECD paper 
computes the replacement ratios under a number of cases based on income, previous earnings, 
and duration of unemployment spells; this approach considers a 40-year-old worker. Each year 
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gross replacement ratios are calculated for 20 countries from 1961 to 1995; net replacement 
ratios are calculated for 18 countries using 1995 data. For the replacement ratio, calculations of 
unemployment insurance, family/child benefits and housing benefits are counted as 
unemployment income. In 1995, the gross (net) average replacement ratios for Canada was 27% 
(43%), for USA it was 12% (16%), Germany was 26% (54%) and France was 38% (55%); the 
highest ranked country was Denmark with a gross (net) replacement ratio of 71% (81%). For all 
OECD countries altogether, the average gross replacement ratio was found to be 31% while the 
net ratio was estimated at 50%, two-thirds larger than the gross replacement ratio. A strong 
correlation, Spearman‘s rank correlation coefficient, of Q=0.73 was discovered between gross 
and net replacement ratios for 1995. Martin concluded that benefit entitlements, for the OECD 
countries, have been on the rise from 1961 to 1995, and that replacement rates are always higher 
when the effects of taxation are accounted for.  
 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠  (2.1) 
A paper done by the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) (1995) performs a similar 
study as Martin (1996) and calculates net replacement ratios using data from 1993. The study 
done by the CPB, calculates replacement ratios using incomes from unemployment insurance, 
unemployment assistance, family benefits and housing benefit. The paper focuses on EU 
member countries and 3 states in the USA, including New York, Texas and California. Three 
types of households (single person, married couple with children and married couple without 
children,) and two income levels (average production worker (APW) and minimum wage) are 
examined. The average net replacement ratios for the United States, Germany and France were 
41%, 68% and 75%, respectively; the highest ranked country was Denmark with a replacement 
ratio of 90%. The study finds that couples with children/dependents have the highest replacement 
ratios due to tax advantages and family/child benefits. Additionally, the individuals least affected 
from the income loss of moving from employment to unemployment were those working at the 
minimum wage level; the average income loss was less than 10% for minimum wage workers.  
 𝐶𝑃𝐵  𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  (𝑁𝑅𝑅) = 𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠  (2.2) 
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 In another example, seven European countries, referred to as the Group of Seven, 
conducted a coordinated study measuring UI generosity via replacement ratios (Seven Country 
Group, 1996). The countries involved were Germany, France, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. Similar to the OECD and CPB studies, gross and net replacement 
ratios are calculated for six different levels of income and eight household compositions. 
Housing benefits and child/family allowances are counted towards unemployment income if it 
applies to the household type and income level. The paper finds that for all studied countries, the 
replacement ratios were 80% or higher for those with lower income. Similarly to the CPB study, 
replacement ratios were found to be higher for households with children/dependents. Table 2.1 
presents comparable net replacement ratios from Martin (1996), Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 
(1995), and Seven Country Group (1996). The replacement ratios in Table 2.1 calculate the 
unemployment benefits over a 5-year unemployment spell.  
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛    𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  (2.3) 
 
 8 
Table 2.1 Comparable Replacement Ratios From OECD, CPB, and Group of Seven 
Country Net Replacement Ratios (% of prior income) 
OECD 
(1994/1995) 
CPB 
(1993) 
Group of Seven 
(1994) 
Belgium 65 66 n/a 
Denmark 81 90 73 
Finland 83 n/a 75 
France 68 75 52 
Germany 68 68 55 
Greece n/a 28 n/a 
Ireland 49 67 n/a 
Italy 19 61 n/a 
The Netherlands 82 78 67 
Portugal n/a 44 n/a 
Spain 53 59 n/a 
Sweden 86 n/a 67 
United Kingdom 69 63 46 
United States 19 41 n/a 
Note. Table taken from Martin (1996). Source. Martin (1996), Central Planning Bureau (CPB) (1995), and Seven 
Country Group (1996) 
 The economic literature investigating the impact of UI on the unemployment rate has 
primarily used a replacement ratio, r, or some other composite measure as a measure of UI 
generosity. Papers such as Grubel, Maki, and Sax (1975), Grubel and Maki (1976) and Miller 
(1987) used replacement ratios, r, as a measure of UI generosity. A paper by Fortin (1989) uses a 
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measure of UI generosity which is the product of three variables: the coverage (proportion of 
labour force ensured); the replacement rate; and, the duration ratio (D/M, the ratio of maximum 
duration of benefits to minimum duration of benefits). The measure by Fortin, 
coverage*r*(D/M), is based on a classical labour supply model (Fortin, 1984). Other utilized UI 
generosity measures are r*coverage (Keil & Symons, 1990), r*(D/M) (Lemieux & MacLeod, 
2000) and the maximum UI benefit duration (Milbourne, Purvis, & Scoones, 1991). Schulze 
(2005) measures UI generosity for Germany by formulating 14 different indices based on 
replacement rates, eligibility, coverage, and duration ratio (D/M). The author finds that, for 
almost all indices, UI generosity from 1986 to 2003 increased contrary to the replacement rate 
studies that show a steady decline over that same time period. The remaining literature review 
will cover papers that measure UI generosity using an alternative method to replacement ratios. 
A European Commission Paper by Stovicek and Turrini (2012) compares unemployment 
benefit systems among European countries using a ‘synthetic’ indicator. One of the goals of the 
paper is to rank the unemployment benefit policies of European countries in terms of generosity. 
The synthetic indicator takes into account unemployment benefits and duration of benefits. The 
generosity measure is shown in equation (2.4) and according to Esser, Ferrarini, Nelson, Palme, 
and Sjöberg (2013) “The indicator corresponds to the sum of all benefits received during the 
unemployment spell in terms of previous labour earnings” (p. 11).  
 𝑈𝐵𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑛𝑟𝑟!"!!!!! ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"! + 𝑛𝑟𝑟!" ∗   𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" (2.4) 
Here, “nrr stands for net replacement rate, UI and UA at the pedix of variables denote, 
respectively, unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, the index i refers to the 
different replacement levels for unemployment insurance over the unemployment spell” (Esser et 
al., 2013) (p. 12). The authors find, using their metric, that UI generosity remained stable 
between 2001 and 2011 for the EU countries that had no UI reforms. “ The overall generosity of 
unemployment benefit systems exhibits a high degree of variation across EU countries, with 
Belgium, Malta, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Portugal having much more generous 
benefit systems than EU average while opposite is the case in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Estonia.” (Esser et al., 2013) (p. 17). 
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A paper by Sargent (1995) creates an index that measures the generosity of the Canadian 
EI System using a model-based approach (labour-leisure decision model). The measure by 
Sargent (1995) takes into account the EI policies of Canada, the replacement rate, eligibility 
requirements and coverage. The index of EI generosity is actually a measure of disincentives 
caused by the presence of UI. As described by Sargent (1995), the index is based on a model 
where agents, who prefer leisure and work, choose their labour force participation, and optimal 
duration of employment and unemployment based on the EI policy parameters. Labour force 
participation choices for an agent are: full employment; partial employment and receive EI; or, 
leave the labour force entirely. The model is based on the labour-leisure model with perfect 
certainty. The Sargent index of UI generosity is the estimated unemployment rate 𝑢∗ from the 
model defined as: 
 𝑢∗ =    𝐷 + 𝐴𝐷 + 𝐴 +𝑀   [  1 − 1 − 𝑝𝐷 𝐷 + 𝐴1 + 𝑝𝐷 𝑀 !] (2.5) 
Here, D is the maximum duration of EI benefits, M is the minimum required employment for EI 
coverage, p is the replacement ratio, and A is the duration of the waiting period. “The parameter 
θ is the scale parameter from a Pareto distribution and it is estimated as the coefficient of the 
[natural log] ln of the labour force participation rate on ln(1+ρD/M), which Sargent estimates as 
0.199” (Grey & L’Italien, 2002) (p. 20). The Sargent index is reported with the estimated 
unemployment rate (Equation 2.5) for 1970 as the reference year; the index value for 1970 is set 
at 100 and index values before 1970 are set at zero. Results shown in Figure 2.1 indicate that the 
Sargent index has declined steadily from 1976 to 2000.  
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Figure 2.1 Sargent Index for Canada’s EI System 
 
Source. Table taken from James, S., et al. (2007). The Canadian Labour Force Participation Rate Revisited: Cohort 
and Wealth Effects Take Hold. Working Paper 2007-01, Finance Canada. 
Another paper by Grey and L’Italien (2002) modifies the Sargent (1995) methodology by 
adding elements from a standard job search model. Uncertainty is added to original framework 
by allowing the arrival of job offers to be unknown. However, the authors’ findings conclude 
that the addition of uncertainty, via the arrival of job offers, have very little impact compared to 
the trends and results of the original methodology (Sargent, 1995). 
This summarizes the variety of studies done on measuring UI generosity. The most 
common method for comparing UI generosity internationally is to calculate a replacement ratio 
for each country. However, no single replacement rate can summarize UI generosity; a range of 
replacement rates would have to be calculated that corresponds to age, unemployment history, 
prior earnings and household composition. While replacement ratio studies are common, a 
replacement ratio can only measure one aspect of UI policy and it ignores policy features such 
monitoring, economic climate, benefit duration, qualification criteria. Other authors attempt to 
find an alternative to the replacement ratio methodology. These alternative measures involve 
using an index measure that incorporates variables such as qualification criteria and benefit 
durations. However, one flaw of these indices is that there is no clear way of judging which 
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index metric is appropriate for measuring UI generosity. And finally, a paper by Sargent (1995) 
uses a model-based approach of a labour-leisure model to measure disincentive from UI. The 
model-approach is a step towards a more grounded way of measuring UI generosity. The next 
section will cover a genuine model-based framework for measuring UI generosity, which also 
incorporates the unemployment rate and average unemployment duration of the country. 
2.2. Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann (PSZ) Generosity Measure 
The model-based measure created by Pallage et al. (2013) produces a metric of UI 
generosity based on different aspects of UI such as the benefit duration, replacement ratios, 
qualification criteria, and economic conditions. The methodology involves simulating two 
economies, one that is modeled after a country’s UI program and another of a simple UI system 
that offers UI benefits indefinitely. The models are similar in every way but the UI system in 
place. The generosity measure is calculated as the replacement ratio in the simpler UI model that 
makes the agent indifferent to both UI policies. This thesis utilizes the framework by Pallage et 
al. (2013), consequently this section provides a more comprehensive overview of the utilized 
methodology and findings of the study. 
The models used by Pallage et al. (2013) feature heterogeneous agents that can self-
insure against future unemployment spells via saving but have no access to credit markets. 
Agents in the model optimize consumption and leisure to maximize an infinite stream of 
discounted (expected) utilities. Employment opportunities are randomly drawn in each period of 
unemployment and an agent can receive a job offer that can be either accepted or declined. The 
probability of receiving a job offer is dependent on whether a job was offered last period. A tax 
rate is applied to all income and unemployment benefits that fund the entire UI program with a 
balanced budget.  
Pallage et al. (2013) simulate two dynamic general equilibrium models. One model 
parameterizes a realistic UI program with waiting periods, a duration of eligibility, an UI benefit 
schedule, and social program benefits. The second model describes a simple system where UI 
benefits are offered indefinitely until employment occurs. The agent’s household problem is 
formulated into a recursive Bellman equation. Both models are calibrated to match the country’s 
average unemployment duration and unemployment rate. From the realistic UI model, the 
 13 
expected value of the welfare program (ω), the average utility, is calculated. Using the expected 
value of the welfare program, a level of UI benefits is found in the simplistic UI system, which 
produces welfare equal to ω. The UI generosity measure is the replacement ratio in the simple UI 
model that makes the agent indifferent to both UI policies. 
The authors apply the described methodology to the United Kingdom (UK) in order to 
study the evolution of UI generosity from 1972-2002. The results conclude that generosity has 
sharply dropped since the 1980’s and has been on a steady decline. These results contradict 
replacement rate studies of the UK, which generally show that UI generosity has increased via 
increasing replacement rates. Additionally, Pallage et al. (2013) compare their UI generosity 
measure to a naïve measure of UI generosity. This naïve measure of UI generosity is constructed 
by calculating the present value of benefits received during an unemployment spell; this measure 
does not take into account UI program specifics. When applied to the UK between 1972-2002, 
the naïve measure found a steady decline in UI generosity. However, the naïve measure fails to 
capture the sharp drop in the early 1980’s found in their model-based measure. Pallage et al. 
(2013) use this exercise to highlight the fact that one-dimensional generosity metrics fail to 
measure UI generosity. 
In another paper by Pallage et al. (2008), a similar methodology is used to compare the 
United States (more specifically, Ohio) to France in terms of UI generosity. Their generosity 
metric calculates a value of 50% and 15% for France and United States, respectively. The 
authors conclude that France is three times more generous than the United States for the year 
2005. Along with the main results, robustness checks were conducted to examine how the 
generosity measures changed depending on the calibration parameters. The most significant 
change in the results came from reducing the risk aversion parameters from 2.5 to 1.1, making 
UI generosity measures similar in both countries. The authors reason that “The basic intuition is 
that when agents do not care much about fluctuations in consumption and leisure, fluctuations in 
income matter little as well and whether the labor market conditions are different or the system is 
designed in various ways has little impact (Pallage et al., 2008)”. Overall, changes in calibration 
parameters did not change the conclusion of the paper. 
 
The Pallage et al. (2013) methodology for measuring UI generosity incorporates many 
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features of UI systems. The modeling includes eligibility criteria, UI benefit durations, a waiting 
period, and a social assistance alternative for those who fail to qualify for UI coverage. 
Additionally, the models are calibrated to match the country’s unemployment rate and average 
unemployment duration. However, Pallage et al. (2013) methodology for measuring UI 
generosity is not without problems. The matching algorithm based on average utility may not be 
measuring generosity: by matching two systems based on welfare/average utility it is measuring 
how efficient the UI system relative to the simple UI scheme, in terms of consumption-
smoothing (i.e. stable consumption from employment to unemployment). The measure in this 
study is a metric of how efficient the realistic UI program is relative to the simple UI scheme 
where benefits are paid indefinitely. To measure generosity, another matching criteria should be 
used. This thesis will utilize a simplified version of the model developed by Pallage et al. (2013) 
and an alternative matching criteria to measure UI generosity. 
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3. COUNTRY OVERVIEWS: UI AND WELFARE POLICIES 
This chapter provides an overview of unemployment benefits and social 
assistance/welfare policies of the countries studied in this paper.  The unemployment benefit 
systems of Canada, the United States, Germany (pre-reform and post-reform) and France are 
summarized. The overview of UI and social assistance policies pertains to a single person with 
no dependents/children. Hence, information for family benefits, lone parent benefits, child 
benefits etc. are not presented here. Country data and information uses 2013 as a reference 
except for Germany pre-reform, which uses 2002 as the reference year. Section 3.5 summarizes 
the UI and social assistance/welfare polices for all the countries. 
Information for each country came from government websites and documents, however 
the primary source came from the benefit system overviews done by the OECD (2015). The 
systematic overviews are done for all OECD countries and provide detailed information in 
regards to unemployment benefits, social assistance, housing benefits, family benefits, lone-
parent benefits, employment-conditional benefits, and the tax treatment of benefits. The reports 
are done for each year spanning from 2001 to 2013 and were last updated March 2015.  
3.1. Canada 
In Canada, the UI system is named Employment Insurance (EI) and pays out a proportion 
of past income, which is financed by contributions paid by employers and employees. The EI 
program is compulsory and offers four different types of benefits including regular benefits, 
maternity benefits, fishing benefits, work-sharing benefits, and special benefits. Focus is on 
regular benefits as they are offered when an individual loses their job that causes a loss or 
interruption in income for a minimum of seven days (Employment Insurance Act). The EI 
system divides Canada into 58 employment regions, where benefit durations and eligibility are 
determined by the regional unemployment rate. A higher regional unemployment rate extends 
the duration of benefits and makes it easier to qualify for EI. Each province in Canada is in 
charge of handling and administering social assistance. Ontario’s social assistance program, 
Ontario Works, is detailed in this section. Ontario Works is a needs-tested benefit that pays out 
an allowance to cover a proportion of housing costs and basic needs. Information for Canada is 
derived from OECD (2015), Employment Insurance Act, Leonard (2010) and Service Canada 
(2014). 
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Eligibility for EI is based on the number of hours worked in the qualifying period. The 
qualifying period is a period before job loss that is usually set at 52 weeks. The rules pertaining 
to the number of work hours required to qualify, depend on a mechanism called the Variable 
Entrance Requirement (VER). The VER mechanic makes it easier to qualify for benefits; the 
mechanism also extends the duration of benefits payable when regional unemployment rises and 
vice versa. Qualification for EI benefits requires between 420 and 700 hours of work in the 
qualifying period. If regional unemployment is under 6%, 700 hours of work are required in the 
qualifying period and if unemployment is above 13%, 420 work hours are required in the 
qualifying period. How regional unemployment affect EI qualification work hours is outlined in 
Table 3.1. Along with the work hours requirement, it is also required that the claimant is able to 
work and is actively searching for employment.  
Table 3.1 EI Entrance Requirements 
Regional rate of unemployment 
(%) 
Required number of insured 
hours of employment 
6 and under 700 
Over 6 to 7 665 
Over 7 to 8 630 
Over 8 to 9 595 
Over 9 to 11 550 
Over 10 to 11 525 
Over 11 to 12 490 
Over 12 to 13 455 
Over 13 420 
Note. Table adapted from Employment Insurance Act. S.C. 1996, c. 23. Canada. 
 The duration of EI benefits range from a minimum of 14 weeks to a maximum of 45 
weeks and is determined by the amount of work hours in the qualifying period. The maximum 
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and minimum duration vary slightly with the regional unemployment rate; higher unemployment 
rates increase the minimum/maximum benefit durations and reduce the amount of work hours 
required. For regional unemployment rate of 6% and under, the minimum benefit duration is 14 
weeks and maximum is 36 weeks, which requires 700 work hours and 1820+ work hours, 
respectively. Before the benefit period begins, there is a mandatory 2-week waiting period in 
which no benefits are paid out; this does not affect the payment schedule but the timing the first 
payment is received. Appendix C contains more information on this topic. 
The EI benefit amount is calculated based on the weekly insurable earnings of the 
claimant. For 2013, the maximum yearly insurable earnings (MIE) were capped at a maximum of 
CAD 47,400 corresponding to a weekly cap of CAD 912. The MIE is determined through the 
Employment Insurance Act, by using the average weekly industrial wage multiplied by 52. The 
weekly insurable earnings for a claimant are calculated based on the total insurable wages earned 
in the rate calculation period (RCP); the RCP is the last 26 weeks of the qualification period. The 
weekly insurable earnings are calculated by taking the total insurable earnings in the RCP and 
dividing them by the larger of the two divisors, that is, either the total number of weeks worked 
during the RCP (a maximum of 26), or a divisor that is determined by the regional rate of 
unemployment (Table 3.2). The weekly benefits received are 55% of weekly insurable earnings, 
which can be paid up to a maximum of CAD 501 per week. Finally, EI benefits are taxable and 
paid out at weekly intervals. 
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Table 3.2 EI Benefit Divisors 
Regional rate of 
unemployment (%) 
Divisor 
6 and under 22 
Over 6 to 7 21 
Over 7 to 8 20 
Over 8 to 9 19 
Over 9 to 11 18 
Over 10 to 11 17 
Over 11 to 12 16 
Over 12 to 13 15 
Over 13 14 
Note. Table adapted from Employment Insurance Act. S.C. 1996, c. 23. Canada. 
Income from EI is subject to taxes that are deducted from each payment. Federal, 
provincial or territorial taxes are deducted from EI benefits. Benefits from EI can be subject to 
repayment. If income for the tax year is 1.25 times greater than the maximum insurable earnings, 
a claimant must pay back a portion of EI benefits received. The amount repaid is equal to 30% of 
the amount above the maximum insurable earnings times 1.5 or the total benefits received in the 
tax year, whichever is lower. 
The social assistance in Canada is determined by each province and territory. Ontario’s 
social assistance program, named Ontario Works, is used to represent Canada’s social assistance 
policies; Ontario Works is needs tested and offers an allowance that covers the cost of housing 
and basic needs such as food. The allowance is non-taxable and is paid out at a monthly 
frequency. For a single person with no children, the maximum allowance for 2013 was set at 
CAD 606 (CAD 230 basic allowance + CAD 376 housing allowance; Table 3.3). The maximum 
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allowance is augmented by the presence of children of a spouse (Table 3.3). Benefits are paid 
indefinitely as long as the claimant remains eligible. 
Table 3.3 Ontario Works Monthly Maximum Allowances 
 (Basic allowance + Housing allowance) 
Family structure  Single Couple  
No children  CAD 606 (230+376)  CAD 1043 (453+590)  
One child aged 0 - 17  CAD 940 (350+590)  CAD 1094 (453+641)  
Two children aged 0 - 17  CAD 991 (350+641)  CAD 1148 (453+695)  
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
3.2. United States 
 In the United States, unemployment insurance is administered at the state level and is 
overseen by the Federal government. UI policies for each state follow rules set out by the US 
Department of Labor; however, each state varies in eligibility criteria, benefit duration, and 
maximum benefit amount. Michigan is detailed in this section and is used to represent the United 
States’ UI system. Michigan’s UI pays a weekly benefit based on a percentage of prior 
employment wages. Eligibility and benefit duration are determined by employment history and 
past wages. The UI program is compulsory in the United States and is funded by taxes and 
contributions from employers. In regards to welfare, this paper classifies the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) as social assistance. The program is administered by the 
Food and Nutrition Services under the Department of Agriculture and it provides allowance for 
nutrition and food costs. Additionally, housing assistance is counted as social assistance as 
SNAP only provides allowance to cover basic food needs. Information for the United States 
came from OECD (2015), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (2015), UIA 
(2015), and United States Department of Labor (2011). 
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A basic prerequisite for Michigan’s UI benefits is that the claimant is able to work and 
will seek employment opportunities while receiving benefits. Eligibility for UI benefits are 
determined by high quarter wages (HQW) and wages earned in the base period. High quarter 
wages are the total wages from the highest earning quarter in the base period. The base period is 
defined as the first four quarters of the last five calendar quarters prior to the claim.  
There are two ways to qualify for UI benefits. The ‘regular’ qualifying criteria requires 
that wages must be earned in at least two quarters of the base period, earning at least USD 2,871 
in one of the quarters; total wages in the base period must be at least 1.5 times the HQW. For 
2013, the total wages in the base period were required to be at least USD 4,307 to qualify for UI 
benefits. The second way to qualify with the ‘alternative’ criteria is that wages must be earned in 
at least two quarters and total wages in base period must equal 20 times the state’s minimum 
wage. With the alternative criteria2, for 2013, total wages must be at least USD 17,868 for at 
least two quarters.  
The amount of UI benefits payable is determined by the HQW in the base period. UI 
benefits per week equal 4.1% of the HQW plus an additional USD 6 for each dependent, up to a 
maximum of USD 30. For 2013, the maximum UI benefit was set at USD 362 with a minimum 
benefit of USD 117. Benefits are paid out at a weekly frequency; income from UI benefits is 
taxable and subjected to both Federal and State taxation. However, not all States make UI 
benefits taxable at the State level. 
 UI benefits are offered for a maximum of 203 weeks and a minimum of 14 weeks. The 
number of weeks of UI entitlement is calculated by multiplying the total base wages by 0.40 then 
dividing by the weekly UI benefit amount and rounding down to the nearest half-week. Benefits 
are payable immediately with no required waiting period. 
In times of high unemployment, there are two programs that can be enacted on the State 
level that allow UI to be extended once benefits have been exhausted. The two programs are the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program and the Extended Benefits (EB) 
                                                
2  The alternative qualifying criteria is more restrictive since it looks at those with less work history 
(2 quarters versus 4 quarters of work) 
3  The maximum duration was reduced from 26 weeks to 20 weeks in 2013. It was previously 26 
weeks (2003-2013).  
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program. The EUC program is a Federal program that provides temporary extension of 
unemployment benefits. It is a four-tier program with each tier extending benefits by a set 
amount. Each tier is activated if the 3-month seasonally adjusted total unemployment rate is 
above a certain threshold. Table 3.4 outlines the guidelines for EUC; Tier 1, 2, 3, and 4 extend 
the maximum duration of benefits by 14, 14, 9 and 7 weeks, respectively. Tiers are activated in 
ascending order with duration extensions of each tier being additive. The legislation for the EUC 
program (EUC08) was authorized by the Federal government in 2008 and was set to expire at the 
end of December 2013. 
 Along with EUC, the EB program provides an extension of unemployment benefits once 
UI and EUC benefits have been exhausted. The program is enacted once the state unemployment 
rate has reached a certain threshold. EB offers a maximum of 13-week extension of benefits. 
During high unemployment, the maximum extension of benefits increases from 13 to 20 weeks 
(Table 3.4). For Michigan, the EB program was last initiated from January 25, 2009 to February 
18, 2012 and was not enacted in 2013.  
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Table 3.4 United States Overview of UI Program4 
UI Benefits 
Programs 
State Qualification Enacted in 
Michigan? 
(2013) 
Maximum Number of 
Weeks  
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD) 
Regular UI Benefits 
(Michigan) 
- Always 20 USD 117 – 
USD 362 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 1 
All States Qualify Yes 14 weeks or 80% of the 
regular state maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits  
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 2 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 
6 percent 
Yes 14 weeks or 54% of the 
regular state maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 3 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 
7 percent 
Yes 9 weeks or 50% of the 
regular state maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 4 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 
9 percent 
No 13 weeks or 80% of the 
regular state maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Extended Benefits 
(EB) 
State with a 13-week UR of 5 
percent or higher, and 120 
percent above the UR rate for 
the corresponding 12-week 
period in the two previous 
years 
No  13 (20) weeks or 50% 
(80%) of the regular state 
maximum UI duration  
(During periods of 
unemployment of at least 9 
percent) 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
 
                                                
4  The maximum duration, benefit amounts, and State qualifications are for 2013. The rules changed 
in 2013. For State qualifications (2010) that is used in the modeling process see Appendix C.
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Social assistance will be represented by SNAP (formerly known as the Food Stamps 
program) and the Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8). SNAP is designed to provide 
low-income households with enough income to cover food costs. To qualify for SNAP a 
household must pass a means test; the household’s gross monthly income must not exceed 130% 
of the poverty guideline and counted/net monthly must not exceed 100% of the poverty guideline. 
For 2011, the net income guideline was USD 1,838 per month. The benefit amount is calculated 
based on family size and monthly income. Table 3.5 shows the eligibility criteria and maximum 
benefits for a given household size. For a one-person household, monthly net and gross income 
not exceeding USD 931 and USD 1211, respectively, entitles the claimant a maximum allowance 
of USD 200. Benefits are paid out indefinitely as long the claimant remains eligible. The 
allowance is non-taxable and is paid out at a monthly frequency. 
 The Section 8 rental assistance program, for low-income households, covers a proportion 
of the cost for rent and utilities. The program is administered by the local public housing 
agencies and is funded federally by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). In general, to qualify for the program, the household’s average income must be below 50% 
the local area median income. Recipients are expected to contribute 30% of their income towards 
rent. The allowance for housing is paid as the difference between the Fair Market Rents (FMR) 
of the area and the income contributed towards the rent. The FMR is calculated by the HUD, 
which determines the average (gross) rent based on number of bedrooms, geographical location 
and the cost of utilities. The allowance is paid directly to the landlord and the utilities company. 
For Detroit, Michigan, the FMR in 2013 for a one-bedroom and a two-bedroom rental unit was 
USD 629 and USD 821 respectively. On a national scale, the average FMR for a one-bedroom 
unit was USD 755 and for a two-bedroom was USD 945. Housing assistance is non-taxable and 
it is offered as long as the household qualifies. 
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Table 3.5 SNAP Allowance and Eligibility Criteria 
Household Size 
(Persons) 
Maximum 
Benefit (USD) 
Gross Income 
Eligibility Limit 
(USD) 
Net Income 
Eligibility Limit 
(USD) 
1  200  1211  931  
2  367  1640  1261  
3  526  2069  1591  
4  668  2498  1921  
5  793  2927  2251  
6  952  3356  2581  
7  1052  3785  2911  
8  1202  4214  3241  
Each additional 
person  
+150  +429  +330  
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
3.3. Germany 
The overview of the UI mechanism in Germany is divided into two sections. Presented 
first is the pre-reform UI and welfare policies using 2002 as a reference. Second, post-reform UI 
and welfare policies are summarized using 2013 as the reference year. It should be noted that the 
post-reform UI policies between 2008 and 2013 remained the same.  
German labour market policies, called the Hartz Reforms, were instituted between 2003 
and 2005. The goal of the reforms according to Jacobi and Kluve (2006) were: 
“(a) Improving employment services and policy measures, (b) activating the unemployed, 
and (c) fostering employment demand by deregulating the labour market. To this end, the 
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reform radically modernized the organizational structure of public employment services, 
modified many of the already existing measures of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 
and introduced a set of new ones.” (p. 4) 
In terms of UI structure, in 2005, unemployment assistance and social welfare were combined 
into one benefit that paid an amount less than social welfare in year’s prior. Jacobi and Kluve 
(2006) also states “the reform fundamentally changed the institutional and legal framework that 
determines the rights and duties of the unemployed, most importantly, the benefit system. 
Furthermore, employment protection was reduced in some segments of the labour market.” 
3.3.1. Germany Pre-Reform (2002) 
In Germany, before the Hartz reforms of 2003-2005, the unemployment benefits system 
consisted of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance.  Unemployment insurance, 
known as Arbeitslosenversicherung, was a benefit that paid out a portion of insured income for a 
limited duration. The benefit payout period was determined by employment history. 
Unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) was a means-tested income support measure that 
paid out a proportion of prior income, as long as the claimant remained eligible. Social assistance 
or Sozialhilfe was a means-tested program that paid out a standard rate plus a percentage of the 
standard rate for each additional family member. The UI benefits were compulsory in Germany 
and non-taxable with unemployment insurance being contributions funded and unemployment 
assistance being tax funded. Information for Germany (pre-reform/2002) came from OECD 
(2015), and Adema, Gray, and Kahl (2003). 
Qualification for unemployment insurance, Arbeitslosenversicherung, was based on 
employment and contribution history. A claimant had to be employed for at least 12 months and 
contribute for at least 12 months in the last 3 years. The claimant had to also register at a local 
Public Employment Center (PES). By registering at the PES, the claimant was able to accept 
suitable job opportunities from the PES and partake in employment (activation) programs. The 
claimant had an opportunity to decline job offers if the employment offered substantially less 
than their last job. For the first three months of unemployment, the claimant had an option to 
reject job offers that paid 80% or less, after three months the threshold decreased to 70% and 
after a six-month period all job offers that offered wages higher than UI benefits had to be 
accepted.  
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Unemployment insurance benefits were calculated based on prior net income and 
whether the claimant had dependents. The benefit amount was calculated using the average of 
net monthly income with gross monthly income capped at EURO 4,700. The benefit amount 
equalled 67% of net average income of the last six months for an individual with children 
younger than 18 years old; it paid out 60% in any other case. The income from UI was non-
taxable and was considered a net benefit since it paid out a proportion of net income. Benefits 
were paid out every 30 days. 
The duration of benefits was based on the duration of continuous paid contributions prior 
to unemployment. Assuming a person is younger than 45 years of age, the benefit period ranged 
from a minimum of 6 months to a maximum of 12 months. To qualify for the maximum benefit 
durations, a claimant had to be employed/make contributions for 24 months (Table 3.6). 
Individuals age 55 or older were entitled to higher maximum benefit durations if proper 
contributions were paid (Table 3.6). Benefits were paid immediately with no waiting period. 
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Table 3.6 Germany (Pre-Reform) Unemployment Insurance Benefit Duration Calculations 
Contribution 
period 
(months)  
Employment 
period 
(years)  
Benefit payment duration (months) Varying with age 
 
Up to 45  45 and over  47 and over  52 and over  57 and over  
12 3 6 6 6 6 6 
16 7 8 8 8 8 8 
20 7 10 10 10 10 10 
24 7 12 12 12 12 12 
28 7  14 14 14 14 
32 7  16 16 16 16 
36 7  18 18 18 18 
40 7   20 20 20 
44 7   22 22 22 
48 7    24 24 
52 7    26 26 
56 7     28 
60 7     30 
64 7     32 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
Unemployment assistance, Arbeitslosenhilfe, was available to those who exhausted UI 
benefits, those who did not qualify for full UI benefits or those who received unemployment 
insurance/assistance benefits within the previous year. The benefit amount was calculated using 
the average of monthly income with gross monthly income capped at EURO 4,700. That benefit 
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was means-tested and paid out 53% of previous net earnings or 57% if the claimant had at least 
one dependent child. The duration of benefits were indefinite as long as the claimant remained 
eligible. Benefits were non-taxable and were paid out every 7 days. 
Social assistance, Sozialhilfe, was viewed as a minimum income support benefit that paid 
an allowance that covered the cost of living. Benefits were non-taxable and were paid out every 
7 days. To be entitled for social assistance, the claimant had to be between the age of 15 and 65 
years of age, pass a means test, and capable of work. The means test looked at the income of the 
claimant, and other family members. The (monthly) standard benefit amounts for a single person 
or head of a household were EURO 292 and EURO 282 for East and West Germany, 
respectively. For additional household members the benefit increased by a proportion of the 
standard rate (Table 3.7). Along with the standard rate, there was a monthly housing and heating 
allowance. From Table 3.8, for a person living alone, the estimated housing benefit amount for 
heating and house were EURO 302 a month in 2002 (OECD, 2015). Social assistance benefits 
were offered indefinitely as long as the claimant remained eligible. 
Table 3.7 Germany (Pre-Reform) Social Assistance Standard Benefit Amounts 
Household Size (Person) Monthly Benefit Allowance (EURO) 
Head of Household/Living 
Alone 
Standard Rate (SR) = EURO 292/282 
(West/East Germany)  
Up to 6 Years Old 50% of SR or 55% of SR for Single 
Parent 
7 year old – 13 year old 65% of SR 
14 year old – 17 year old 90% of SR 
18 years old + 80% of SR 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
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Table 3.85 Germany (Pre-Reform) Estimated Monthly Housing and Heating Cost/Benefit 
 1st Person 
(EURO) 
1st Person 
(EURO) 
Per Child (EURO) 
Housing cost 260  80 56 
Heating cost  42 16  4  
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
3.3.2. Germany Post-Reform (2013) 
Beginning January 1, 2005 the unemployment assistance and social assistance policies 
were reformed in Germany. The former social assistance (Sozialhilfe) and unemployment 
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) programs were combined into one unemployment assistance/social 
benefit; the benefit offered is set at the same level of benefits as the prior social assistance 
program. The UI program, unemployment benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld I), pays out a benefit equal 
to a portion of average monthly income net of taxes. Unemployment benefit I eligibility is 
determined by employment history and contributions. The UI program is compulsory with 
contributions taken from each paycheque. Unemployment benefit II/social benefit 
(Arbeitslosengeld II / Sozialgeld) is a means-tested and needs-based income support that covers 
necessary subsistence for as long as the claimant is eligible. Information for Germany (post-
reform) came from OECD (2015), European Commission (2013b), Unemployment Benefits 
(2015) and Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2015). 
Eligibility for unemployment benefit I is based upon the length of former employment 
and contributions paid. To qualify for UI benefits, a claimant must have been employed for a 
minimum of 12 months and must have made at least 12 months of contributions in the last 24 
months. Along with these requirements, a claimant must be registered as unemployed with the 
employment office, actively looking for employment, and must be younger than retirement age.  
                                                
5  The rent and heating costs were calculated from the Federal Statistical Office data (Federal 
Statistical Office, Fachserie 13: Reihe 4 “Wohngeld ”, 1995). See OECD (2015) for detailed information  
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The duration of benefits is dependent on the claimant’s age and contribution history. The 
benefit duration ranges from 6 months to 48 months. For a claimant less than 50 years old, a 
contribution period of 12 months gives 6 months of UI benefits and contributions of 24 months 
or higher gives benefits for a maximum of 12 months. Claimant between the age of 50 and 58 are 
able to receive longer duration of benefits. For older persons the maximum benefit duration is 
246 months if contributions were made for the past 48 months (Table 3.9). Table 3.9 outlines the 
benefit duration calculation in regards to contribution time and age. 
Table 3.9 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit I Duration Calculations 
Contribution Period 
(months) 
Benefit Payment Duration 
(months) 
12 6 
16 8 
20 10 
24 12 
30 (Age 50+) 15 
36 (Age 55+) 18 
48 (Age 58+) 24 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
Unemployment benefits I are based on the net prior earnings and are paid out every 30 
days with no waiting period. Average monthly earnings, from the past 12 months, are used to 
calculate the benefit amount, with the maximum monthly amount (gross) capped at EURO 4,900 
for East Germany and EURO 5,600 for West Germany. Benefits are paid at 60% of net average 
monthly earnings and at 67% for those with children. For a claimant without children, the 
                                                
6  Between 2006 and 2007 the maximum benefit duration was 18 months. 
 
 31 
maximum monthly benefit amount is EURO 2,940 in East Germany and EURO 3,360 in West 
Germany. The UI benefits are non-taxable and are based on net income rather than gross income. 
Unemployment benefit II/Social benefit combines the pre-reform programs of social 
assistance and unemployment assistance into one benefit program. The combined benefit is non-
taxable and is needs based and means-tested. The basic prerequisites are that a claimant must be 
between the age of 15 and 65, and do not have sufficient means to meet a basic level of 
subsistence. Those who exhausted unemployment benefits I can apply but must also be capable 
of working and searching for employment. The unemployment benefit II/social benefit covers 
the cost of food, personal hygiene, household and everyday items. Also, an additional housing 
allowance may cover the cost of housing and utilities if it is within reason; the square meters of a 
dwelling generally determine what is deemed acceptable for housing benefits. For a single 
person with no dependents, the acceptable housing size was 50 to 60 square meters (Table 3.12). 
For a single adult the monthly allowance was EURO 382 with a maximum possible housing 
allowance of EURO 413 (Table 3.10 & 3.11). Tables 3.10 and 3.11 outline the benefit amounts 
for each household member. Additional benefits may be allowed for pregnant mothers, lone 
parents, and persons with expensive nutritional diet requirements as a result of medical 
conditions. Duration of benefits is granted indefinitely as long as claimants are in need, however, 
every six months claimants have to prove they still qualify for benefits. 
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Table 3.10 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit II/Social Benefit Allowance  
Household Unit Benefit Amount per month (EURO) 
Single adult 382 
Adult Partner  345 
19 year old – 25 year old 306 
15 year old – 18 year old 289 
7 year old – 14 year old 255 
Up to 6 years old 224 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
Table 3.11 Germany (Post-Reform) Unemployment Benefit II/Social Benefit Housing 
Allowance  
Household Unit Maximum Housing Allowance per month (EURO) 
1 person 413 
2 persons  495 
3 persons 587 
4 persons 665 
5 persons 787 
Additional persons 95 
Note. The maximum housing allowance was determined using Berlin as a reference. Table adapted from OECD 
(2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information. Retrieved May 1, 
2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-information.htm. 
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Table 3.12 Germany (Post-Reform) Reasonable Housing Size for Housing Allowance 
Household Unit Acceptable Housing Criteria 
1 person 45-50 square meters 
2 persons  60 square meters or 2 bedrooms 
3 persons 75 square meters or 3 bedrooms 
4 persons 85-90 square meters or 4 bedrooms 
Additional person An additional 12 square meters or bedroom 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
3.4. France 
The unemployment insurance scheme in France is called l’allocation d’aide au retour à 
l’emploi (ARE). The UI system pays out a proportion of prior income every month. Eligibility is 
dependent on past contributions with a minimum requirement of four months worked. Duration 
of UI benefits follows the philosophy of ‘one day worked is one day covered’. Those who 
exhaust UI benefits may apply for unemployment assistance (Allocation de Solidarité 
Spécifique) and receive benefits that are means-tested. Unemployment assistance benefits are 
paid out as long as the claimant remains eligible. Social Assistance (Revenu de solidarité) is a 
means-tested program that pays out a minimum amount of income to cover subsistence, which is 
offered indefinitely as long as the claimant qualifies. Both unemployment insurance and social 
assistance pay the same amount of maximum benefits. The UI system is compulsory with the 
system being funded through contributions paid by employees. Information for France came 
from OECD (2015), European Commission (2013a), Unemployment Benefits in France (2015) 
and Aides Sociales (2015). 
Eligibility for ARE is based on the amount of time contributions were made in the 
qualifying period. The qualifying period, for those under the age of 50, is 28 months before 
employment end, and 36 months for those age 50 and older. To qualify for ARE, a claimant is 
required to have a minimum of 120 days of contribution in their qualifying period. Along with 
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the contributions requirement, a claimant is expected to be able to work, search for employment 
and be registered as unemployed with “Pôle employ”. 
The duration of benefits is determined by and equal to the contribution time in the 
qualifying period. For example, a person with 200 days of contributions would receive benefits 
for 200 days. For those under 50 years of age, the maximum time the benefits can be received is 
set at 24 months; the maximum duration is 36 months for individuals 50 years of age and over. 
Benefits are not paid out immediately as a 7-day waiting period is required before the first 
payment is made. 
 The ARE benefit amounts are calculated using the average gross monthly income and the 
daily reference wage/salaire journalier de reference (SJR) of the claimant. The gross monthly 
income and the daily reference wage/SJR is based on the total wages earned 12 months prior to 
job loss. A claimant who made a total of EURO 30,000 in the last 12 months would have a SJR 
of EURO 82.20 per day (EURO 30,000/365) and gross monthly average of EURO 2,500. The 
maximum gross monthly income is capped at EURO 12,344. The amount of AER benefits 
payable falls into 4 categories and depends on the gross monthly income. Table 3.13 describes 
the relation between the gross monthly income and the daily benefit amount. The AER daily 
benefit cannot exceed 75% of SJR and cannot be below EURO 28.38.  Incomes from AER 
benefits are taxable and paid out at a monthly frequency. 
Table 3.13 France ARE Benefit Calculation 
Average gross monthly salary 
(EURO) 
Average gross monthly salary  
Less than 1,135  75% of gross salary  
Between 1,135 and 1,243 28.38 per day 
Between 1,243 and 2,054 40.4% of SJR + 11.64 
Between 2,054 and 12.344 57.4% of SJR 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
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Unemployment assistance in France is called Allocation de Solidarité Spécifique (ASS) 
or ‘Solidarity Benefit’ and is a means-tested benefit. The ASS is only available to those who 
exhausted their UI benefits (ARE). Similar to the ARE, a claimant must be able to work and 
actively search for employment. To be eligible, the claimant must have been employed for 5 
years, in the last 10 years, preceding the period before the last day of employment. Also, the 
composite household monthly income, from other sources, must be below EURO 1,277.10 for a 
single person or EURO 1,772.10 for a couple living together to qualify. The benefit amount from 
the ASS pays a maximum of EURO 16.11 per day, which is equivalent to EURO 483.30 a 
month. To qualify for maximum benefits a single person and a couple must have a monthly 
income below EURO 644.40 and EURO 1,288.80, respectively (Table 3.14 & 3.15). It is 
possible to receive benefits for up to 12 months, that reduce over time, if a claimant is re-
employed with 78 hours of work a month (Table 3.16). The duration of benefits are fixed at 6-
month intervals and can be renewed indefinitely as long as the claimant remains eligible. The 
ASS benefits are taxable and paid out every month. 
Table 3.14 France ASS Benefit Amount for Single Person 
Net Monthly Income (EURO) ASS Benefit (EURO/month) 
Less than 644.40  483.30  (16.11 per day) 
Between 664.40 and 1,277.10 Difference between 1,277.10 and Monthly Income 
Above 1,277.10 No Benefit 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
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Table 3.15 France ASS Benefit Amount for Couple/Household of Two 
Net Monthly Income (EURO) ASS Benefit (EURO/month) 
Less than 1,288.80  483.30  (16.11 per day) 
Between 1,288.80 and 1,772.10 Difference between 1,772.10 and monthly income 
Above 1,772.10 No Benefit 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
Table 3.16 France ASS Benefit while Employed 
Gross Monthly Income 
(EURO) 
During Month 1 – Month 6 of 
Employment 
During Month 6 – Month 12 of 
Employment 
Less than 722.69  ASS paid in full The number of days compensated is 
reduced by 40% of the gross monthly 
earnings divided by the daily ASS 
benefit 
Equal or Exceed 722.69 The number of days compensated is 
reduced by 40% of gross monthly 
earnings exceeding 722.69 divided 
by the daily ASS benefit 
The number of days compensated is 
reduced by 40% of the gross monthly 
earnings divided by the daily ASS 
benefit 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
The social assistance equivalent in France is called Revenu de solidarité (RSA) or 
‘Active Solidarity Income’. RSA is designed to guarantee a minimum amount of income to cover 
subsistence and housing costs. RSA takes into account all income of the household to determine 
eligibility and it is made available to the unemployed and employed who have a low level of 
income. To qualify for the RSA, the total monthly income cannot exceed 1.4 times the monthly 
minimum wage. Also, the claimant must be at least 25 years of age, however exceptions can be 
made for those between the ages of 18 and 24. The payable benefit amount depends on family 
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situation and is described in Tables 3.17 & 3.18. For a single person with no dependents, the 
maximum monthly RSA basic allowance equals EURO 483.24 and the RSA maximum housing 
allowance equals EURO 57.99 (Table 3.17 & 3.18). The allowance income is non-taxable and 
paid out every month. The duration of the RSA is indefinite as long as monthly income is below 
the threshold; however, allowances are updated every 3 months to reflect any changes in 
monthly income or the claimant’s situation. 
Table 3.17 France RSA Monthly Basic Allowance 
Number of Child/Dependents (under the age of 25) Single (EURO) Family (EURO) 
0 483.24 724.86 
1 724.86 869.83 
2 869.83 1,014.80 
Per Additional Child/Dependent  193.30 193.30 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
Table 3.18 France Monthly RSA Housing Allowance 
Household Size Maximum RSA Housing Allowance (EURO) 
1 57.99 
2 114.98 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
3.5. Country Summaries 
 This section briefly summarizes the social insurance (UI, UA, and SA) policies of each 
country. The descriptions refer to a single person of non-retirement age with no children or 
dependents. Tables 3.19 to 3.21 provide an additional visual overview of the UI, UA, and SA 
policies of each country.  
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Canada’s UI system contains a feature named the Variable Entrance Requirement (VER), 
where the maximum/minimum possible UI benefit duration increases if the regional 
unemployment rises. Also, VER makes it easier to qualify for UI when regional unemployment 
is high and vice versa. Qualification for UI is based on the number of work hours in the last 52 
weeks; requiring between 420 and 700 work hours, depending on the VER. UI benefits are paid 
weekly and are calculated at 55% of the maximum insurance earnings (MIE) divided by 52. The 
MIE for 2013 was CAD 47,40 with the maximum weekly benefit amount at CAD 501. A 
mandatory two-week waiting period is required before UI benefits are paid. UI benefits are 
payable for a minimum of 14 weeks to a maximum of 45 weeks. Social assistance in Canada is 
means-tested and pays out a flat benefit depending on household composition. For a single 
person with no benefits the monthly SA amount was CAD 606. 
 The United States (Michigan) social insurance policies for the unemployed consist of UI 
and SA. Qualification for UI is based on prior wages from the last five quarters. The UI benefit 
amount equals a proportion of prior earnings with benefits being capped at USD 362. The 
duration of benefits range from a minimum of 14 weeks to a maximum of 20 weeks. In times of 
high unemployment, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program and the 
Extended Benefits (EB) program may extend unemployment insurance benefit durations. These 
programs are enacted if state unemployment reaches a certain level. SNAP and Section 8 
(housing assistance) are classified in this paper as social assistance. SNAP provides allowance 
for basic food needs while Section 8 provides allowance for rental housing. For a single person 
with no dependents, the maximum monthly allowance for SNAP in 2013 was USD 200. Housing 
assistance allowance is calculated based on the fair market rent of the region and the number of 
bedrooms. 
 For France, the social insurance policies for the unemployed include UI, UA, and SA. 
Qualification for UI requires that the claimant must have paid contributions for at least 120 days 
within the last 2 years. The duration of UI benefit equals the number of contribution days in the 
last 2 years; the maximum duration is capped at 24 months. Before benefits are paid there is a 
mandatory 7-day waiting period. UI benefits are based on the prior monthly gross income. The 
minimum UI benefit for 2013 was EURO 851.40 per month. UA is a means-tested benefit and is 
only available to those who exhaust UI benefits. UA pays a maximum benefit of EURO 483.30 a 
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month and it is paid indefinitely as long as the claimant is eligible. SA is a means-tested benefit 
and pays a maximum allowance of EURO 483.24.  
 For Germany (pre-reform), the social insurances policies for the unemployed consisted of 
UI, UA and SA. To qualify for UI, contributions must be made for a minimum of 12 months in 
the last 3 years and individuals must have been employed for a minimum of 12 months. UI 
benefits are paid monthly and are calculated at 60% of prior net monthly income. Duration of 
benefits lasts a minimum of 6 months to a maximum of 12 months, depending on contribution 
history during the last 3 years. UA is means-tested and is available to those who exhaust UI 
benefits. UA pays a weekly amount that equals 53% of prior net weekly income and is offered as 
long as the claimant qualifies. SA is means-tested and offers a standard allowance depending on 
a household size. For 2002, a single person with no dependents received EURO 594 a month. 
 For Germany (post-reform), the social insurance policies are similar to the pre-reform 
polices except for the past UA and SA programs were combined into one program where 
benefits equal to previous SA amounts. In order to qualify for UI, the claimant must have been 
employed for a minimum of 12 months and with contributions being made for a minimum of 12 
months in the last 2 years. UI benefits are calculated at 60% of prior net monthly income and last 
for a minimum of 6 months to a maximum of 12 months. UA/SA is a means-tested benefit that 
offers a standard allowance depending on household size. For 2013, a single person with no 
dependents would receive EURO 796 a month. 
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Table 3.19 Country Unemployment Insurance Policy Overview 
Country Eligibility 
Conditions 
Waiting 
Period 
(Days) 
Max Benefit 
Duration 
(Weeks) 
UI Benefit UI Benefits 
Taxable 
Canada 
(2013) 
400-700 hours 
worked 
+contributions 
14 45 55% of Insurable 
Earnings (Gross) 
Yes 
United 
States 
(2013) 
26 weeks worked + 
minimum earnings  
None 20*  
 
4.1% of High 
Quarter Wages 
(Gross) 
Yes 
Germany 
(2002) 
12 months worked 
+ 12 months of 
contribution in last 
3 years 
None 52 60% of prior 
income (Net) 
Yes 
Germany 
(2013) 
12 months worked 
+ 12 months of 
contribution in last 
2 years 
None 52 60% of prior 
income (Net) 
Yes 
France 
(2013) 
4 months of 
contributions in last 
36 months 
7 52 Between 57% and 
75% of income 
Yes 
Note. *USA’s maximum benefit duration, for 2013, reported ignores the possible extension from EUC Tier1-4 and 
EB Program. The maximum benefit duration including the extensions program would be around 24 months. 
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Table 3.20 Country Unemployment Assistance Policy Overview 
Country Eligibility 
Conditions 
Waiting 
Period  
Benefit 
Duration 
UA Benefit  UA Benefits 
Taxable 
Germany 
(2002) 
Exhausted UI 
benefits + must 
pass means test 
None No Limit 53% of prior income 
(net) 
No 
France 
(2013) 
Exhausted UI 
benefits + must 
pass means test 
None 6 months 
(renewable) 
Fixed Amount Yes 
Note. *Germany ‘s Unemployment benefit II/Social Benefit (2013) can be classified as UA and/or SA. For the sake 
of simplicity it will be classified as SA and therefore included in Table 3.21. 
Table 3.21 Country Social Assistance Policy Overview 
Country Eligibility 
Conditions 
Waiting 
Period 
Benefit 
Duration  
SA Benefit  SA 
Benefits 
Taxable 
Canada 
(2013) 
Must pass 
means test 
No No 
Limit 
Fixed 
Amount 
No 
United 
States 
(2013) 
Must pass 
means test 
No No 
Limit 
Fixed 
Amount 
No 
Germany 
(2002) 
Must pass 
means test 
No No 
Limit 
Fixed 
Amount 
No 
Germany 
(2013) 
Must pass 
means test 
No No 
Limit 
Fixed 
Amount 
No 
France 
(2013) 
Must pass 
means test 
No No 
Limit 
Fixed 
Amount 
No 
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4. MODELING STRATEGY 
4.1. Model Foundation 
A simplified model of the one developed in Pallage et al. (2013) (Section 2.2) is used to 
generate a metric of generosity. Two models are constructed, the first is a complex UI model that 
contains features specific to a country’s UI policy such as a waiting period, eligibility criteria, UI 
benefit durations et cetera. The second is a simplistic UI model where everyone is eligible for UI 
benefits; benefits in this simple model are paid indefinitely until re-employment. These models 
are calibrated to match a country’s unemployment rate and share of short-term unemployment 
(unemployment lasting a maximum of 3 months); the only difference in the models is the UI 
policies. The two calibrated models are used to compute a metric of  ‘generosity’ and efficiency 
for a country-specific UI policy. Chapter 5 will elaborate on the generosity and efficiency 
metrics. What follows is a summary of the modeling foundation and assumptions. 
 The framework follows the methodology laid out by Pallage et al. (2013) but with some 
simplifications. Following in the spirit of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), this paper assumes 
that agents have no other sources of income, and no assets and that consumption in all periods, 
employed and unemployed, is predetermined. Therefore, consumption in each period is given 
exogenously and income equates to consumption; therefore, an agent cannot save or borrow to 
smooth consumption. Without this assumption, agents would exhibit a new behaviour in the 
form of precautionary savings; agents would save a portion of their income to insure against 
future unemployment spells. This assumption is different from the Pallage et al. (2013) paper 
since agents in their methodology can self-insure through savings.  
Another assumption made is that agents in the model are assumed to be homogeneous in 
terms of income and assets. This is unlike the Pallage et al. (2013) methodology where agents are 
heterogeneous due to the accumulation of assets via savings. However, there is some 
heterogeneity in the model due to agents being in different states of employment or 
unemployment. The model contains infinitely-lived agents and it is assumed that time is discrete. 
All transition probabilities of moving from one state to another (i.e. employment to 
unemployment) are exogenously or endogenously determined and unchanging over time. The 
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transition probabilities such as the average duration of UI benefits7, conditional on being 
unemployment, are exogenously determined. The transitional probabilities of leaving 
unemployment, via job search, are endogenously chosen by the agents in the model. The models 
in this paper utilize a set of Bellman equations, where each equation represents a possible state 
such as unemployment with UI benefits, employment with no UI entitlement and etc.  
An important feature of the model is the incorporation of endogenous search intensities 
Costain (1997), which are not present in the original Pallage et al. (2013) methodology. Search 
intensities are associated with a cost-of-job-search function, which describes a disutility to the 
agent. The cost of job search is denoted as 𝜑 𝑝 , where 𝑝 is the job search intensity and is 
normalized as a probability of finding employment next period; the search intensity is bounded 
between 0 and 1. The cost-of-search function will ideally be a strictly convex function such that 𝜑′ 𝑝    > 0, 𝜑!! 𝑝 > 0 and chosen such that the solution is interior. These properties ensure that 
increasing search intensities become more costly at an increasing rate. Agents in these models 
only care about job search intensities. Since agents cannot self-insure, because consumption is 
pre-determined, the agents’ only optimizing decision is their search intensities while unemployed. 
When modeling UI it is important to recognize the importance of moral hazard. In this 
framework, moral hazard is present due to the implementation of endogenous job search 
intensities. Job search is considered a disutility and an agent can influence the probability of 
finding employment; the search intensity is equal to the probability of finding employment. 
Therefore, an increase in UI benefits will cause the marginal benefit of search to decrease, which 
leads to lower search intensities and longer unemployment durations. This is similar to the works 
of Costain (1997), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Pissarides (2000). However, it differs 
from Pallage et al. (2013) as they implement moral hazard in their sensitivity analysis by using 
imperfect monitoring from Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992); in their approach agents who 
decline job offers have a predetermined probability to stay unemployed and receive UI benefits. 
Finally, it is assumed that the government funds all social insurance programs through 
taxation. A proportional tax rate is calculated such that it exactly funds the UI program and other 
                                                
7  The average duration of being in a state, in this modeling framework, is equal to 1 divided by the 
probability of transitioning out that state.  
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social insurance programs (social assistance and unemployment assistance). The proportional tax 
rate is applied to both wages and benefits. 
It is important to note that the duration spent in each state by the agent is stochastic and 
not deterministic. As described later, the states in the model are calibrated for their respective 
average duration and not for a fixed duration. For example, UI benefits may last for a maximum 
of 20 weeks therefore the average duration of UI benefit is calibrated to 20 weeks (conditional on 
being unemployed). The transition between states by the agent is a Markov process (discrete-
time) where agents each time unit (week) face a probability of staying in their current state or 
moving to a different state. This is possible since transition probabilities, i.e.) the probability 
distribution, is unchanging over time8. Therefore, it is possible to solve for steady state values of 
being in each state and for the unemployment rate. 
In summary, the framework of this paper uses a model with endogenous job search 
intensities, in which otherwise homogeneous agents pass through different states. Income and 
benefits from social programs are fixed at a pre-determined level where the accumulation of 
assets (savings) is not allowed. This paper uses a simplified version of the model used by Pallage 
et al. (2013).  
4.2. Simplistic UI System 
The simplified UI system consists of two states, employment and unemployment with UI 
benefits. Agents in this model optimize their instantaneous and expected discounted utilities via 
job search intensity (𝑝). Each period an agent can either be employed (𝑊!) and receive an 
income of 𝑐! or be unemployed (𝑈!) and receive a benefit of 𝑐!, and exert an optimal level of 
job search. While employed, an agent can become unemployed next period with a probability of 𝜆 (job separation rate) and while unemployed an agent can become employed next period with a 
probability 𝑝 (job search intensity). For simplicity, the job search intensity is normalized as a 
probability of finding employment next period. The following value state equations are specified 
in Equation (4.1) and (4.2). Where 𝑡 is the time index, 𝑢   .  the utility function, 𝜑   .  cost of job 
search, 𝛽 the discount factor, 𝜏 is the tax rate that fully funds the UI system, and E [.] the 
expected value operator.  
                                                
8  This is possible since endogenous search intensities are not dependent on time. 
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 𝑊! = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽𝐸   𝑈!!! +𝑊!!!  (4.1) 
 𝑈! = max!   {𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜑 𝑝 +   𝛽𝐸[  𝑊!!! + 𝑈!!!]} (4.2) 
Equation (4.1) and (4.2) can be simplified further since we assume in the model that the 
job separation rate (𝜆), income (𝑐!), benefits (𝑐!), and transition probabilities9 are constants 
regardless of the time index  (𝑡). As a result, all state values of   𝑊! and   𝑈! are constant over time. 
Therefore,   𝑊! =   𝑊!!! =𝑊  and   𝑈! =   𝑈!!! = 𝑈  for all values of 𝑡 . The new value state 
equations are shown in Equation (4.3) and (4.4).  
 𝑊 = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈 + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊  (4.3) 
 𝑈 = max!   {𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜑 𝑝 +   𝛽[  𝑝𝑊 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑈]} (4.4) 
 Equation (4.3) represents the value of working. While an agent is in a working state he 
receives an income of 𝑐! with a utility of 𝑢 𝑐! , and an expected utility between unemployment 
and employment. Also, the agent faces the risk of job loss next period with a probability 𝜆 and a 
probability of (1− 𝜆) of staying employed next period. Figure 4.1 shows the Markov process for 
the simplistic UI system. 
Equation (4.4) represents the value of unemployment with UI benefits. While an agent is 
in an unemployed state, the agent receives a benefit of   𝑐! with a utility of 𝑢 𝑐! , and optimizes 
via search intensity, 𝑝, to maximize the current state value of unemployment. Furthermore, 
agents receive a disutility from search effort 𝜑 𝑝 . With a probability of 𝑝 an agent can become 
employed next period and with a probability (1− 𝑝) stay unemployed next period (Figure 4.1).  
The agent chooses the job search intensity  𝑝 such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal search intensity satisfies Equation (4.5) where 
the marginal cost of job search,  𝜑′ 𝑝 , is equal to the marginal (discounted) benefit of job search, 𝛽   𝑊 − 𝑈 .  
 −𝜑′ 𝑝 +   𝛽   𝑊 − 𝑈 = 0 (4.5) 
                                                
9  Transition probabilities are the probabilities of moving from one state to another (unemployment 
to employment and vice versa). 
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Figure 4.1 Simple UI Model Markov Process 
 
4.3. Complex UI Systems 
The complex UI model can consist of many different states of unemployment and 
employment depending on the country being modeled. Presented in this section are the complex 
models of each country. These models will be similar to the simplistic UI system but with the 
incorporation of conditional transition probabilities.10 The transition probabilities are represented 
by 𝑡!!, where the transition probability of moving from state X to state Y is 𝑡!"#"$  !  !"#"$  !  and the 
probability of staying in the same state X next period is 𝑡!"#"$  !  !"#"$  ! .  
4.3.1. Canada 
Unemployment Insurance in Canada is called Employment Insurance (EI) and will be 
referred to as such in this section. The modeling of Canada will incorporate: 
a) Employment without EI entitlement: working but not entitled to EI benefits.  
b) EI minimum qualification criteria: those who are working without EI entitlement for a 
certain duration, on average, will quality for minimum EI entitlement11. 
c) EI maximum qualification criteria: those who are working for a certain duration with 
minimum EI entitlement, on average, will quality for maximum EI entitlement12 (max 
benefit duration). 
                                                
10  The transition probabilities are conditional on the agent being unemployed or employed next 
period. 
11  Minimum EI/UI Entitlement status refers to being qualified for EI/UI with minimum conditions 
met 
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d) Employment with EI entitlement: working and entitled to EI benefits. 
e) A waiting period: a standard waiting period before receiving EI benefits. 
f) Employment Insurance (EI): while unemployed receive EI benefits that last, on 
average, for a predetermined benefit duration. EI benefit amount and duration is 
dependent on EI entitlement status. 
g) Social Assistance: is paid to the unemployed who exhaust their EI benefits or those 
who failed to qualify for EI and is paid until re-employment occurs. 
This system will be modeled with three different states of employment and five different 
states of unemployment. The value state equations for Canada are stated in Equations (4.6) to 
(4.13) where 𝑊!"#$  is the state of working without EI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$#  is the state of 
working with minimum EI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$%  is the state of working with maximum EI 
entitlement, 𝑈!"#$%"& /  𝑈!"#$"%& is the waiting period state before receiving EI benefits,  𝑈!"#$% / 𝑈!"#$% is the state of receiving EI benefits, and 𝑈!" is the state of receiving social assistance 
benefits.13  
 𝑊!"#$ = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!" + 1 − 𝜆 {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑊!"#$ + 𝑡!"#$  !"#$#𝑊!"#$#}  (4.6) 
 𝑊!"#$# = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$%"& + 1 − 𝜆 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$#𝑊!"#$# + 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$%𝑊!"#$%  (4.7) 
 𝑊!"#$% = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$"%& + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊!"#$%  (4.8) 
 𝑈!"#$%"& = max!!"#$%"&      𝑢 𝑐!"#$%"&(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%"&+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%"&𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$%"& 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$%"&𝑈!"#$%"& + 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% } (4.9) 
 𝑈!"#$"%& = max!!"#$"%&      𝑢 𝑐!"#$"%&(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$"%&+ 𝛽   𝑝!!"#!$%𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$"%& 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$"%&𝑈!"#$"%& + 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% } (4.10) 
                                                                                                                                                       
12  Maximum EI/UI Entitlement status refers to being qualified for EI/UI that ensures the maximum 
benefit duration. 
13  The ‘max’ and ‘min’ prefixes on the state equations denote the states related to the maximum or 
minimum EI/UI entitlement status. For example, an agent with the max EI entitlement would go through 
the 𝑈!"#$"%& and 𝑈!"#$% state when unemployed. 
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 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$% 1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$+ 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ]} (4.11) 
 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$% 1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$+ 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ]} (4.12) 
 𝑈!" = max!!"    𝑢 𝑐!"(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜑 𝑝!" + 𝛽   𝑝!"  𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!" 𝑈!"    (4.13) 
Depending on the state, an agent receives a predetermined level of income 𝑐!"#"$ with 
utility of 𝑢 𝑐!"#"$ , and exerts an optimal level of search intensity 𝑝!"#"$while unemployed. If 
the agent is in an unemployed state, the agent receives a disutility of 𝜑 𝑝!"#"$  from job search. 
Additionally, a proportional tax rate 𝜏 is applied to all wages and benefits that fully fund the 
social insurance system (EI and SA). 
 The agent chooses the job search intensity 𝑝!"#"$ such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal set of search intensities satisfies Equations 
(4.14- 4.18). 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$%"& + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$%"&𝑈!"#$%"& + 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% = 0 (4.14) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$"%& + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$"%&𝑈!"#$"%& + 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% = 0 (4.15) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    = 0 (4.16) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    = 0 (4.17) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" + 𝛽     𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!"   = 0 (4.18) 
The optimal search intensities for each (unemployment) value state is chosen such that the 
marginal cost of job search equates to the discounted marginal benefit. Since the value states are 
time-invariant this implies that the optimal search intensities are time-invariant as well. 
Figure 4.2 shows the Markov process for the Canada model. For this model, agents who 
are not entitled to EI benefits (𝑊!"#$) and are unemployed next period will receive social 
assistance (𝑈!"). To be qualified for minimum EI entitlement (𝑊!"#$#), an agent must work 
without EI entitlement (𝑊!"#$) for an average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$  !"#$#. To qualify for maximum EI 
entitlement (𝑊!"#$%), an agent must work for an average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$#  !"#!"while entitled to 
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minimum EI benefits. If unemployment occurs while working with EI entitlement (𝑊!"#"$%&'), 
an agent will go to a waiting period (𝑈!"#"$%&#'") before receiving EI benefits (𝑈!"#"$%&')14. 
Once EI benefits are exhausted an agent will move to social assistance (𝑈!") During the 
unemployed states of the waiting period, EI benefits, and social assistance the agent has a 
probability of re-employment with a probability of 𝑝!"#"$%&#'", 𝑝!"#"$%&' and 𝑝!", respectively. 
All those who are re-employed must re-qualify for benefits and thus enter the 𝑊!"#$ state. 
Figure 4.2 Canada Model Markov Process 
 
4.3.2. United States 
The modeling of the United States will incorporate: 
a) Employment without UI entitlement: working but not entitled to UI benefits.  
b) UI qualification criteria: those who are working for a certain duration, on average, 
will quality for maximum UI entitlement15 (max benefit duration). 
                                                
14  The prefix ‘status’ refers to EI Entitlement status (minimum, maximum). 
15  Min UI Entitlement has been excluded due to the high average income data for the USA. Those 
who qualify with the minimum UI requirements also qualify for the maximum benefit amount, and 
duration (Max UI entitlement). 
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c) Employment with UI entitlement: working and entitled to UI benefits. 
d) Unemployment Insurance: while unemployed receive UI benefits that last, on average, 
for a predetermined benefit duration. 
e) Emergency Unemployment Compensation Tier 1-316: is paid to those who exhaust UI 
benefits and is an extension of UI benefits. 
f) Social Assistance: is paid to the unemployed who exhaust their UI benefits (including 
EUC Tier 1-2 benefits) or those who failed to qualify for UI and is paid until re-
employment occurs 
This system will be modeled with two different states of employment and two different 
states of unemployment. The value state equations for the United States are stated in Equations 
(4.19) to (4.22) where 𝑊!"#$ is the state of working without UI entitlement, 𝑊!" the state of 
working with UI entitlement, 𝑈!" and 𝑈!" is the state of receiving social assistance benefits. The 
state of 𝑈!" also includes EUC Tier 1, 2 and 3 programs since they only provided an extension of 
UI benefits, which pay the same benefit amount as UI. 
 𝑊!"#$ = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!" + 1 − 𝜆 {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑊!"#$ + 𝑡!"#$  !" 𝑊!"}  (4.19) 
 𝑊!" = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!" + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊!"  (4.20) 
 𝑈!" = max!!"   {𝑢 𝑐!"(1 − 𝜏 ) − 𝜑 𝑝!" + 𝛽[  𝑝!"𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!" 𝑡!"  !"𝑈!" + 𝑡!"  !"𝑈!" ]} (4.21) 
 𝑈!" = max!!"   {𝑢 𝑐!"(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜑 𝑝!" +   𝛽   𝑝!"  𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!" 𝑈!"   } (4.22) 
Depending on the state, an agent receives a predetermined level of income 𝑐!"#"$ with 
utility of 𝑢 𝑐!"#"$ , and exerts an optimal level of search intensity 𝑝!"#"$while unemployed. If 
the agent is in an unemployed state, the agent receives a disutility of 𝜑 𝑝!"#"$  from job search. 
Additionally, a proportional tax rate 𝜏 is applied to all wages and benefits that fully fund the 
social insurance system (UI and SA). 
                                                
16  EUC Tier 4 and Extended Benefits (EB) Program are excluded due to the average harmonized 
unemployment rate (2003-2013) being below the unemployment rate triggers for EUC Tier 3 and EB.  
 51 
The agent chooses the job search intensity 𝑝!"#"$ such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal set of search intensities satisfies Equations 
(4.23 - 4.24). 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" +   𝛽[  𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"  !"𝑈!" + 𝑡!"  !"𝑈!" = 0 (4.23) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!"   = 0 (4.24) 
The optimal search intensities for each (unemployment) value state is chosen such that the 
marginal cost of job search equates to the discounted marginal benefit.  
Figure 4.3 shows the Markov process for the United States model. For this model, agents 
who are not entitled to UI benefits (𝑊!"#$) and are unemployed next period will receive social 
assistance (𝑈!"). To be qualified for UI entitlement (𝑊!"), an agent must work without UI 
entitlement (𝑊!"#$) for an average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$  !" . If unemployment occurs while working 
with UI entitlement (𝑊!"), an agent will go to a state that pays UI benefits (𝑈!"). Once UI 
benefits are exhausted, including the benefit duration extension from EUC Tier 1 to Tier 3, an 
agent will move to social assistance (𝑈!"). During the unemployed states of UI benefits and the 
social assistance, an agent has a probability of re-employment with a probability of 𝑝!" and 𝑝!", 
respectively. All those who are re-employed must re-qualify for benefits and thus enter the 𝑊!"#$ state. 
Figure 4.3 United States Model Markov Process 
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4.3.3. Germany (Pre-Reform) 
The modeling of pre-reform Germany will incorporate: 
a) Employment without UI entitlement: working but not entitled to UI benefits.  
b) UI minimum qualification criteria: those who are working without UI entitlement for 
a certain duration, on average, will quality for minimum UI entitlement. 
c) UI maximum qualification criteria: those who are working for a certain duration with 
minimum UI entitlement, on average, will quality for maximum UI entitlement (max 
benefit duration). 
d) Unemployment Insurance: while unemployed receive UI benefits that last, on average, 
for a predetermined benefit duration. UI benefit amount and duration is dependent on 
EI entitlement status. 
e) Unemployment Assistance17: is paid to the unemployed who exhaust their UI benefits 
or those who failed to qualify for UI and is paid until re-employment occurs. 
This system will be modeled with three different states of employment and three different 
states of unemployment. The value state equations for Germany (pre-reform) are stated in 
Equations (4.25) to (4.30) where 𝑊!"#$ is the state of working without UI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$# 
is the state of working with minimum UI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$% is the state of working with 
maximum UI entitlement, 𝑈!"#$%   /  𝑈!"#$% is the state of receiving UI benefits, and 𝑈!" is the 
state of receiving unemployment assistance (UA) benefits. 
 𝑊!"#$ = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!" + 1 − 𝜆 {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑊!"#$ + 𝑡!"#$  !"#$#𝑊!"#$#}  (4.25) 
 𝑊!"#$# = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$% + 1 − 𝜆 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$#𝑊!"#$# + 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$%𝑊!"#$%  (4.26) 
 𝑊!"#$% = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$% + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊!"#$%  (4.27) 
 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$%(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    } (4.28) 
                                                
17  Social Assistance has been omitted due to the UA qualification criteria and use of an Infinite-
Horizon Model. See Section 6.2 (UI Policy Calibration) for more details. 
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 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$%(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    } (4.29) 
 𝑈!" = max!!"   {𝑢 𝑐!" − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!" + 𝛽[  𝑝!"𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!" 𝑈!"  ]} (4.30) 
Depending on the state, an agent receives a predetermined level of income 𝑐!"#"$ with 
utility of 𝑢 𝑐!"#"$ , and exerts an optimal level of search intensity 𝑝!"#"$while unemployed. If 
the agent is in an unemployed state, the agent receives a disutility of 𝜑 𝑝!"#"$  from job search. 
Additionally, a proportional tax rate 𝜏 is applied to all wages and benefits that fully fund the 
social insurance system (UI and UA). 
 The agent chooses the job search intensity 𝑝!"#"$ such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal set of search intensities satisfies Equations 
(4.31- 4.33). 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ] (4.31) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ] (4.32) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!"    (4.33) 
The optimal search intensities for each value state is chosen such that the marginal cost of job 
search equates to the discounted marginal benefit.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the Markov process of the Germany pre-reform model. To qualify for 
minimum UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$#) an agent will have to work an average duration 1/𝑡!"#$  !"#$# 
without UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$) and an agent can work an additional average duration of 
1/𝑡!"#$#  !"#$% to quality for maximum UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$%). Agents that become unemployed 
without UI coverage will receive unemployment assistance (𝑈!" ) next period until re-
employment occurs. For those who become unemployed with UI coverage will receive UI 
benefits next period (𝑈!"#"$%&') up to a maximum duration determined by UI entitlement status. 
Those who exhausted UI benefits will receive unemployment assistance (𝑈!" ) until re-
employment occurs. During all states of unemployment 𝑈!"#"$%&' , and 𝑈!"  agents have a 
probability of employment at probability 𝑝!"#"$%&' and 𝑝!", respectively. All those who are re-
employed must re-qualify for benefits and thus enter the 𝑊!"#$ state. 
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Figure 4.4 Germany (Pre-Reform) Model Markov Process 
 
4.3.4. Germany (Post-Reform) 
The modeling of post-reform Germany will incorporate: 
a) Employment without UI entitlement: working but not entitled to UI benefits.  
b) UI minimum qualification criteria: those who are working without UI entitlement for 
a certain duration, on average, will quality for minimum UI entitlement. 
c) UI maximum qualification criteria: those who are working for a certain duration with 
minimum UI entitlement, on average, will quality for maximum UI entitlement (max 
benefit duration). 
d) Unemployment Insurance: while unemployed receive UI benefits that last, on average, 
for a predetermined benefit duration. UI benefit amount and duration is dependent on 
EI entitlement status. 
e) Unemployment Assistance/Social Assistance: is paid to the unemployed who exhaust 
their UI benefits or those who failed to qualify for UI and is paid until re-employment 
occurs. 
This system will be modeled with three different states of employment and three different 
states of unemployment. The value state equations for Germany (post-reform) are stated in 
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Equations (4.34) to (4.39) where 𝑊!"#$ is the state of working without UI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$# 
is the state of working with minimum UI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$% is the state of working with 
maximum UI entitlement, 𝑈!"#$%   /  𝑈!"#$% is the state of receiving UI benefits, and 𝑈!"/!" is 
the state of receiving unemployment assistance/social assistance benefits. 
 𝑊!"#$ = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"/!" + 1 − 𝜆 {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑊!"#$ + 𝑡!"#$  !"#$#𝑊!"#$#}  (4.34) 
 𝑊!"#$# = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$% + 1 − 𝜆 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$#𝑊!"#$# + 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$%𝑊!"#$%  (4.35) 
 𝑊!"#$% = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$% + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊!"#$%  (4.36) 
 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$%(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !"/!"𝑈!"/!"    } 
(4.37) 
 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$%(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !"/!" 𝑈!"/!"    } (4.38) 
 𝑈!"/!" = max!!"/!"   {𝑢 𝑐!"/!" − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"/!" + 𝛽[  𝑝!"/!"𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"/!" 𝑈!"/!"  ]} (4.39) 
Depending on the state, an agent receives a predetermined level of income 𝑐!"#"$ with 
utility of 𝑢 𝑐!"#"$ , and exerts an optimal level of search intensity 𝑝!"#"$while unemployed. If 
the agent is in an unemployed state, the agent receives a disutility of 𝜑 𝑝!"#"$  from job search. 
Additionally, a proportional tax rate 𝜏 is applied to all wages and benefits that fully fund the 
social insurance system (UI and UA/SA). 
 The agent chooses the job search intensity 𝑝!"#"$ such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal set of search intensities satisfies Equations 
(4.40- 4.42). 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !"/!"𝑈!"/!"   ] (4.40) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !"/!" 𝑈!"/!"   ] (4.41) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"/!" + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!"/!"    (4.42) 
The optimal search intensities for each value state is chosen such that the marginal cost of job 
search equates to the discounted marginal benefit.  
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 Figure 4.5 shows the Markov process of the Germany post-reform model. To qualify for 
minimum UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$#) an agent will have to work an average duration 1/𝑡!"#$  !"  
without UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$) and work an additional average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$#  !"#$% to qualify 
for maximum UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$% ). Only those with UI coverage will receive UI 
benefits  (𝑈!"#"$%&') when unemployment occurs; maximum duration of UI benefits depend on 
UI entitlement status. Those who exhausted UI benefits or failed to have UI entitlement (𝑊!"#$) 
will receive unemployment assistance/social assistance (𝑈!"/!") until re-employment occurs. All 
those who are re-employed must re-qualify for benefits and thus enter the 𝑊!"#$ state. 
Figure 4.5 Germany (Post-Reform) Model Markov Process 
 
4.3.5. France 
The modeling of France will incorporate: 
a) Employment without UI entitlement: working but not entitled to UI benefits.  
b) UI minimum qualification criteria: those who are working without UI entitlement for 
a certain duration, on average, will quality for minimum UI entitlement. 
c) UI maximum qualification criteria: those who are working for a certain duration with 
minimum UI entitlement, on average, will quality for maximum UI entitlement (max 
benefit duration). 
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d) Employment with UI entitlement: working and entitled to UI benefits. 
e) A waiting period: a standard waiting period before receiving UI benefits. 
f) Unemployment Insurance: while unemployed receive UI benefits that last, on average, 
for a predetermined benefit duration. UI benefit amount and duration is dependent on 
EI entitlement status. 
g) Social Assistance18: is paid to the unemployed who exhaust their UI benefits or those 
who failed to qualify for UI and is paid until re-employment occurs. 
This system will be modeled with three different states of employment and five different 
states of unemployment. The value state equations for France are stated in Equations (4.43) to 
(4.50) where 𝑊!"#$  is the state of working without UI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$#  is the state of 
working with minimum EI entitlement, 𝑊!"#$%  is the state of working with maximum UI 
entitlement, 𝑈!"#$%"& /  𝑈!"#$"%& is the waiting period state before receiving UI benefits,  𝑈!"#$% 
/ 𝑈!"#$% is the state of receiving EI benefits, and 𝑈!" is the state of receiving social assistance 
benefits. 
 𝑊!"#$ = 𝑢 𝑐!(1 − 𝜏) + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!" + 1 − 𝜆 {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑊!"#$ + 𝑡!"#$  !"#$#𝑊!"#$#}  (4.43) 
 𝑊!"#$# = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$%"& + 1 − 𝜆 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$#𝑊!"#$# + 𝑡!"#$#  !"#$%𝑊!"#$%  (4.44) 
 𝑊!"#$% = 𝑢 𝑐! 1 − 𝜏 + 𝛽   𝜆𝑈!"#$"%& + 1 − 𝜆 𝑊!"#$%  (4.45) 
 𝑈!"#$%"& = max!!"#$%"&      𝑢 𝑐!"#$%"&(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$%"&+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$%"&𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$%"& 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#!"#$𝑈!"#$%"& + 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% } (4.46) 
 𝑈!"#$"%& = max!!"#$"%&      𝑢 𝑐!"#$"%&(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$"%&+ 𝛽   𝑝!"#$"%&𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!"#$"%& 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$"%&𝑈!"#$"%& + 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% } (4.47) 
 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$% 1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$+ 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ]} (4.48) 
                                                
18  Unemployment Assistance has been removed since Social Assistance pays out the same benefit 
amount and UA is offered for an indefinite duration similar to Social Assistance.  
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 𝑈!"#$% = max!!"#$%   {𝑢 𝑐!"#$% 1 − 𝜏 − 𝜑 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽[  𝑝!"#$%𝑊!"#$+ 1 − 𝑝!"#$% 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"   ]} (4.49) 
 𝑈!" = max!!"    𝑢 𝑐!"(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜑 𝑝!" + 𝛽   𝑝!"  𝑊!"#$ + 1 − 𝑝!" 𝑈!"    (4.50) 
Depending on the state, an agent receives a predetermined level of income 𝑐!"#"$ with 
utility of 𝑢 𝑐!"#"$ , and exerts an optimal level of search intensity 𝑝!"#"$while unemployed. If 
the agent is in an unemployed state, the agent receives a disutility of 𝜑 𝑝!"#"$  from job search. 
Additionally, a proportional tax rate 𝜏 is applied to all wages and benefits that fully fund the 
social insurance system (UI, UA, and SA). 
 The agent chooses the job search intensity 𝑝!"#"$ such that it maximizes the value of their 
current (unemployment) value state. The optimal set of search intensities satisfies Equations 
(4.51- 4.55). 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$%"& + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#$%"&𝑈!"#$%"& + 𝑡!"#$%"&  !"#!" 𝑈!"#$% = 0 (4.51) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$"%& + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$"%&𝑈!"#$"%& + 𝑡!"#$"%&  !"#$% 𝑈!"#$% = 0 (4.52) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    = 0 (4.53) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$% + 𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑡!"#$%  !"#$%𝑈!"#$% + 𝑡!"#$%  !" 𝑈!"    = 0 (4.54) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" + 𝛽     𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!"   = 0 (4.55) 
The optimal search intensities for each value state is chosen such that the marginal cost of job 
search equates to the discounted marginal benefit.  
Figure 4.6 shows the Markov process for the France model. To qualify for minimum UI 
entitlement, and move to state 𝑊!"#$#, an agent must work for an average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$  !"#$# 
without UI coverage (𝑊!"#$) and an additional average duration of 1/𝑡!"#$#!"#$% for maximum UI 
entitlement (𝑊!"#$%). If unemployment occurs while the agent is not entitled to UI benefits, they 
move to social assistance (𝑈!") next period and will remain in that state until re-employment 
occurs. If unemployment occurs while the agent is entitled to UI benefits, the agent moves to a 
mandatory waiting period (𝑈!"#"$%&#'")  before UI benefits begin  (𝑈!"#"$%&'); the duration of UI 
benefits depends on UI entitlement status. When the agent exhausts UI benefits the agents moves 
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to social assistance (𝑈!") until re-employment occurs. While the agent is unemployed in state 𝑈!"#"$%&#'", 𝑈!"#"$%&',  or 𝑈!" the probability of re-employment is 𝑝!"#"$%&#'",𝑝!"#"$%&', and 𝑝!", 
respectively. All those who are re-employed must re-qualify for benefits and thus enter the 𝑊!"#$ state. 
Figure 4.6 France Model Markov Process 
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5. MEASUREMENT STRATEGY 
5.1. Generosity Metric 
  To measure the generosity of a country’s UI system, an approach similar to Pallage et al. 
(2013) is utilized. In their paper, the authors first calculate the average utility from their complex 
UI model. Next, the simple model is solved for a replacement ratio where agents are indifferent 
between the complex and simple UI policies in terms of average utility.  Thus, the replacement 
ratio is determined such that the average utility in the simple model equates to the one in the 
complex model. This paper will use the same technique but with a different matching criterion. 
The generosity metric, in this paper, uses the ratio of the utility from unemployment to 
employment as the matching criterion. Utility units are converted to consumption equivalents for 
easier interpretation. It must be noted that the use of utility or consumption equivalents yields 
identical results.  
The ratio of consumption equivalents of unemployment to unemployment will be referred 
to as the consumption equivalent ratio. The generosity metric will first involve converting the 
welfare of employment and unemployment into its consumption equivalent. Using utility 
functions, the consumption equivalent solves for the consumption required to obtain a level of 
welfare or utility. For the simple model, the consumption equivalent of employment (C!) and 
unemployment (C!)  is formulated as: 
 W =      β!!!  U(C!)!  !!!       →        (1 − 𝛽)W =   U C!       →             C! = 𝑈!!((1 − 𝛽)W  ) (5.1) 
 U =      β!!!  U(C!)!  !!!       →        (1 − 𝛽)U =   U C!       →             C! = 𝑈!!(  (1 − 𝛽)U) (5.2) 
Where 𝑈!!(. )19 is the inverse of the utility function and W and U represent total welfare 
of employment and unemployment. It should be noted that the values of (1− 𝛽)W  and (1− 𝛽)U reduce the welfare values into the average period utility of being employed and 
                                                
19  Assuming natural log utility, the inverse utility function would be the exponent function. 
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unemployed, respectively. The consumption equivalent ratio (Ω!) is defined for the simple 
model in Equation 5.3. 
 Ω! = C!C! =    𝑈!!(   11 − 𝛽 U)𝑈!!(   11 − 𝛽W) 
(5.3) 
Equation (5.3) measures the equivalent consumption between employment and 
unemployment. It can be thought of in two ways, either as a consumption equivalent replacement 
ratio between unemployment and employment, or as a consumption drop from employment to 
unemployment (1-Ω!). For example, a value of 0.3 would signify a replacement ratio of 0.3 
where 30% of consumption equivalent income in the working period is earned while 
unemployed, or it can also be interpreted as the inverse where consumption drops by 70% when 
going from employment to unemployment.  
Similarly for the complex model the consumption equivalent ratio is stated in Equation 
(5.4), where W  and U  are the welfare values of employment and unemployment, and 𝑐!  and c! 
are the consumption equivalents of W   and U. 
 Ω! = C!  C!   =   𝑈!!(  (1 − 𝛽)  W  )𝑈!!(  (1 − 𝛽)U)  (5.4) 
To measure generosity, the simple model’s consumption equivalent ratio (Ω!)  is matched 
to the complex model’s consumption equivalent ratio (   Ω!) . To match the consumption 
equivalent ratios, a replacement ratio in the simple model is calculated such that it satisfies 
Equation (5.5). 
 Ω! = Ω! = !!!! =   !!!((!!!)!  )!!!((!!!)!) =   !!!((!!!)!)!!!((!!!)!)  (5.5) 
The replacement ratio in the simple UI system that satisfies Equation (5.5) is the measure 
of generosity. This final generosity metric will be defined as 𝜃, where: 
 𝜃 = 𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒  𝑈𝐼  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙,Ω!     such  that  𝜃  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠        Ω! = Ω!  
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5.2. Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann (PSZ) Generosity Metric 
 The generosity measure used by Pallage et al. (2013) is briefly summarized here; the 
generosity metric by Pallage et al. (2013) will be referred to as the PSZ metric. The calculation 
of the PSZ metric is identical to the generosity metric in the previous section, but with one 
difference: the average period utility is used as the matching criteria instead of the utility drop 
from moving from employment to unemployment (consumption equivalent ratio). 
Using the same approach as the previous section, the PSZ generosity measure is 
calculated by matching the simple model and the complex model based on average period utility. 
Average period utility is first calculated from the complex model. The replacement ratio/benefit 
that make agents in the simple model indifferent to the complex model, in terms of average 
period utility, is the measure of PSZ generosity. 
Alongside the generosity metric and efficiency metric (see next section), the PSZ 
measure will be generated. In the results sections, comparisons will be made between the PSZ 
metric and generosity metric of this paper. 
5.3. Efficiency Metric 
Measuring generosity alone may not be enough to compare different UI policies. A 
country may be generous, by our definition, but it says very little about the cost or efficiency of 
the UI policy itself. Therefore, another metric will be investigated to give another dimension of 
comparison when evaluating different UI systems. 
 Along with generating a measure of generosity, another metric will be used to compare 
the efficiency of each UI system. The average utility from the complex model will be compared 
to the average utility of a benchmark system20. Efficiency, in this context, is based on the 
criterion of average utility/welfare relative to a benchmark system. The benchmark system will 
be defined as the simple model that pays out an optimal amount of UI benefits such that the total 
welfare/average utility is maximized.21 It should be noted that the optimal UI benefits in the 
                                                
20  This cannot be called an efficient system because the model may not be a globally efficient 
system. 
21  The reason why the simple model or simple UI scheme is used is because it has only one variable 
to optimize welfare with (UI benefits). Using a more complex UI system as the benchmark would 
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benchmark model do not equal or exceed employment wages due to the inclusion of tax. As 
benefits increase, the tax rate rises proportionally in order to fund the UI program; to the agent, 
there is always a cost to increasing UI benefits. Without this assumption, increases in UI benefits 
will always make agents better off. Finally, the efficiency measure will be reported as the 
percentage change in average period utility of moving from the benchmark system to the realistic 
UI system.  The purpose of adding an efficiency measure is to facilitate comparisons of UI 
systems along two dimensions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
complicate the optimization problem since there many UI parameters to optimize with such as benefit 
duration, qualification criteria and benefit payouts schemes. 
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6. ANALYSIS 
6.1. Functional Form Assumptions 
The modeling up to this point has been generalized with no specifics given on the 
functions and values of some parameters. The time unit in these models is calibrated assuming 
weekly intervals. What follows is a comprehensive overview of the assumptions and functions of 
the models. 
Discount Factor: Since the time unit is weekly, the discount rate will be equal to 𝛽=0.999014077 
which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 5%. 
Utility Function: The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is used in this study. 
It is specified in Equation (6.1), where c is consumption and 𝛾 is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
The baseline case will assume a risk aversion 𝛾 = 3. The sensitivity analysis will run results for 𝛾 = 1 and 𝛾 =5. 
 𝑈 𝐶 = 𝑐!!!1 − 𝛾   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝛾 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛾 ≠ 1 =   ln 𝐶           𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝛾 = 1 
(6.1) 
Consumption Equivalent: The consumption equivalent calculations involve the present value of 
welfare for W or U (average period utility) and the inverse functions of the utility function. The 
inverse functions for CRRA utility functions are shown below in Equation (6.2) where CE is 
consumption equivalent, 𝜔 the welfare value (of unemployment or employment), 𝛽 the discount 
factor, and 𝛾 the coefficient of risk aversion.  
 𝐶𝐸 = ( 1 − 𝛽 𝜔 1 − 𝛾 ) !(!!!)  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝛾 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛾 ≠ 1 
=   exp 1 − 𝛽 𝜔           𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝛾 = 1 
(6.2) 
Risk Aversion: The risk aversion parameter of the utility function, γ, in the base case, is initially 
set at 3. Other risk aversion parameters will be investigated in the sensitivity analysis.  
Job Search Cost Function: The cost of job search function is taken from Kroft and Notowidigdo 
(2010). Equation (6.3) represents the cost of job search function, where p is the search intensity, 
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𝛼 is a scalar and 𝛿 is the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort. Hence, higher 𝛿 
increases the marginal cost of job search (Kroft & Notowidigdo, 2010). The ‘exponent’ 
parameter will be set at 𝛿 = 2. 
 𝜑 𝑝 = 𝛼𝑝𝛿𝛿    (6.3) 
Search Intensities: Job search intensities, 𝑝, are bounded between 0 and 1 and are simplified to 
the probability of entering employment next period.  
6.2. UI Policy Calibration 
This section elaborates on the assumptions made when modeling the UI polices of each 
country. These assumptions will determine on how to model UI in terms of parameters. What 
follows are the UI policy and modeling assumptions. 
UI Policy: The UI systems of the United States and Canada have policies that depend on the 
unemployment rate. For Canada, eligibility and benefit duration vary depending on the regional 
unemployment rate. For the United States, the EUC Tier 1-3 and Extended Benefits (EB) 
program are triggered if the state unemployment rate surpasses a pre-determined threshold. It is 
assumed the UI polices are based on the average unemployment rate used in the calibration 
process. For the United States, EUC Tier 4 and EB were not modeled due to the average 
unemployment rate being below the unemployment triggers. For Canada, the maximum benefit 
duration of 45 weeks is reduced to 40 weeks. Additionally, the modeling of UI policy uses 2010 
(2002 for Germany pre-reform) as the reference year; for all countries, except USA, policy rules 
through out their respective study periods remained the same. Before 2008, the EUC and EB 
programs were not implemented in the USA. A longer study period is used for the USA to obtain 
better long-run values for the unemployment rate and share of short-term unemployment. 
Unemployment/Social Assistance Policy: For Germany (Pre-Reform) and France some 
unemployment benefit programs have been removed from the modeling process. France’s 
unemployment assistance program was not modeled due to its similarity to the social assistance 
program in place; UA paid out the same benefit amount and is also offered for an indefinite 
duration after UI benefits are exhausted. Germany’s (Pre-Reform) social assistance program is 
omitted from the model because of the UA qualification criteria and use of an infinite-horizon 
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model. The qualifying criterion for UA was essentially one day of UI or UA benefits within the 
last year (and other conditions). This means that once someone qualifies for UI benefits at some 
point in his life, he will (in this model) always qualify at least for UA (when he loses the job, he 
either qualifies for UI or he has only been working for a very short time, i.e. he received UA 
benefits recently, therefore he qualifies for UA again. In an infinite-horizon model, everyone 
eventually qualifies for UA, so social assistance is omitted from the model. 
Qualification for UI: Agents in the model can qualify for UI with the minimum or the maximum 
UI entitlement. Agents must first qualify for the minimum UI entitlement, which requires the 
minimum conditions to be met. Those with minimum UI entitlement can progress to maximum 
UI entitlement (max UI duration) if additional requirements (work-hours) are met. This was done 
for all countries except the United States. Due to the average income level for the United States, 
agents who qualify with the minimum requirements for UI are automatically entitled to the 
maximum benefit amount and benefit duration. 
Duration of UI: Due to the previous assumption, agents will receive UI benefits, on average, for 
the minimum or maximum possible benefit duration (depending UI entitlement status).  
Waiting Period: It is assumed for the countries, with a mandatory waiting period, that income 
during the waiting period equals the benefits from social assistance. The role of social assistance 
is to guarantee a minimum amount of income for basic needs and shelter. Therefore, it is 
assumed that that no person should receive less than the minimum amount of income, 
determined by the government, necessary for basic needs and shelter. The income during the 
waiting period will be funded by taxes. This can be thought of as savings by the agent, but 
collected and distributed by the government.  
6.3. Data  
 This section will detail how average income and benefits from unemployment insurance, 
unemployment assistance, and social assistance are calculated for each country. Additionally, a 
brief explanation is provided on the calculation of the unemployment rate and the share of short-
term unemployment for use during the calibration process. Data for the harmonized 
unemployment rates, unemployment by duration, consumer price indices, and average/net 
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income data was collected from the OECD. Additional data on UI and SA benefits amounts over 
the years was also obtained from OECD (2015). 
Study Period: The data for the income and benefit calculations, unemployment rate, and the 
share of short-term unemployment by duration will utilize data collected over a long time period 
instead of a single year. In regards to the unemployment rate and the short term-unemployment 
data, this is done to average out any effects of business cycle fluctuations of those variables. For 
Canada, United States, and France data is collected from 2003 to 2013 (ten years). Data is taken 
from 2000-2005 for Germany (pre-reform) and 2008-2013 for Germany (post-reform).  
Unemployment Rate & Unemployment by Durations: For each country, the harmonized 
unemployment rates and unemployment by durations were averaged over the study period to 
give the average unemployment rate and the share of short-term unemployment (unemployment 
lasting a maximum of 3 months) used in the calibration of the models. 
Calculation of Average Income: Income data is taken from the OECD Taxing Wages Reports 
from 2000 to 2013. For each year the OECD calculates the average gross and net annual wages 
of a full time worker who is employed in manual or non-manual labour. For this paper, the 
average annual wages for each year were adjusted for inflation, using 2010 currency, and 
averaged to give the adjusted22 average income used in the models. This was done for each 
country and was calculated using net income. Due to the use of average full-time wages it is 
assumed that agents in the model are employed full-time. 
Income and Benefits: The results of this paper use net average income and net benefits from 
unemployment (when applicable). 
Calculation of Net Unemployment Benefits: Gross benefits amounts, during unemployment, are 
calculated using 2010 policy data. When applicable, the calculation of taxes payable for 
unemployment benefits is based on the annualised benefit amount. The tax calculation uses 2010 
taxation rules for each country to determine the net benefits. 
                                                
22  Adjusted is used to differentiate between the OECD average income estimates for each year and 
the average income calculated for use in this paper.  
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Social Assistance Benefits: Social assistance for Canada, France, and Germany includes a 
housing allowance component. For United States this is not the case, therefore housing 
assistance benefits are included in the calculation of social assistance benefits.  
Treatment of Income and Benefits: adjusted average income and adjusted benefits are 
normalized such that income in the working period equals 1 and benefits while unemployed 
equal a percentage relative to income. This can be alternatively viewed as a replacement ratio i.e. 
UI benefits equal 55% of average wage, SA benefits equal 23% of average wage and 
employment income equals 100%. Net and replacement ratios are calculated. 
Table 6.1 Adjusted Income and Benefits Used In Models (in 2010 Country Currency) 
Country Time 
Period 
Currency 
(2010) 
Average 
Gross 
Income 
Average 
Net 
Income  
Net Min/Max UI 
Benefits (Week) 
Net UA 
Benefits 
(Week) 
Net SA 
Benefits 
(Week) 
Canada 2003-2013 CAD 43,875 33,704 346/420 N/A 135 
United 
States 
2003-2013 USD 44,084 
 
33,556 
 
337  N/A 210 
France 2003-2013 EURO 34,010 
 
24,424 
 
199/338 
 
N/A 
 
119 
 
Germany 
(post-
reform) 
2008-2013 EURO 41,829 
 
25,016 
 
289 
 
N/A 170 
 
Germany 
(pre-
reform) 
2000-2005 EURO 41,368 23,736 274 242 N/A 
Note. All benefits & wages were adjusted for inflation using 2010 currency (of the respective country). See 
Appendix A for more details. The value presented here are the adjusted amounts (previously mentioned) 
6.4. Numerical Solution Algorithm 
 Due to the complexity of the models, a numerical solution algorithm is used to solve the 
agent’s optimization problem and find the tax rate that funds the social insurance policies. The 
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solution algorithm is based on the work of Pollak (2007) and Costain (1997). What follows is the 
algorithm used to solve the complex models. The algorithm uses simplified version of the 
Canada model23 as an example.  
Algorithm: 
1) Guess initial values of states: 𝑊!"#$,   𝑊!",   𝑈!"#$ ,   𝑈!" ,𝑈!"  
a. Set initial tax rate to 0 
2) Optimize the agent’s problem in state   𝑈!"#$  
a. Update state values of 𝑊!"#$,   𝑊!",   𝑈!"#$ ,   𝑈!" ,𝑈!" 
3) Optimize the agent’s problem in state   𝑈!"  
a. Update state values of 𝑊!"#$,   𝑊!",   𝑈!"#$ ,   𝑈!" ,𝑈!" 
4) Optimize the agent’s problem in state   𝑈!"  
a. Update state values of 𝑊!"#$,   𝑊!",   𝑈!"#$ ,   𝑈!" ,𝑈!" 
5) If first-order conditions of   𝑈!"#$ ,   𝑈!" and 𝑈!" are sufficiently close to zero than the 
solution has been found. If not, return to step 2 
6) Calculate the tax rate such that it funds the social insurance policies 
7) Repeat Step 2 –Step 6 with updated tax rate until tax converges  
a. Tax convergence is defined as the absolute difference between current tax value 
and last tax value is less than 1e-06 
The first order conditions for the simplified Canada model are: 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!"#$ +   𝛽   𝑊𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑛 − {𝑡!"#$  !"#$𝑈𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡!"#$  !" 𝑈𝐸𝐼} = 0 (6.4) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝!" +   𝛽   𝑊𝑁𝑜𝐸𝑛 − 𝑡!"  !"𝑈𝐸𝐼 + 𝑡!"  !"𝑈𝑆𝐴 = 0 (6.5) 
 −𝜑′ 𝑝𝑆𝐴 +   𝛽   𝑊!"#$ − 𝑈!" = 0 (6.6) 
In each (unemployment) state, the agent selects a search intensity, 𝑝!"#"$ , where it 
maximizes their current (unemployment) state value; the optimal search intensity is selected such 
that the marginal cost of search and marginal, discounted, benefit of search equal. 
                                                
23  This simplified version assumes the agent is either qualified or not qualified for UI. There is no 
progression from minimum UI entitlement to maximum UI entitlement. 
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6.5. Calibration 
The complex models of each country are calibrated to represent their country. The 
parameters in the models are calibrated such that the models match key characteristics of the 
economy and UI policies; these characteristics include the unemployment rate, the share of short-
term unemployment and the maximum durations of benefit programs. The share of short-term 
unemployment is defined as the proportion of unemployment that lasts for 3 months or less. 
To calibrate the country specific models, first the conditional transition probabilities 
between states are determined. These probabilities are chosen such that they match specific 
duration data. For example, if unemployment insurance benefits last for a maximum of 26 weeks, 
the conditional transition probability of leaving the UI state would be 1/26. This is a conditional 
probability of being unemployed; the duration of benefits is on average 26 weeks since one 
divided by the probability of leaving a state equals average duration. After the conditional 
transition probabilities have been determined, the model is calibrated using 𝛼  and 𝜆  (job 
separation rate) to match the unemployment rate and share of short-term unemployment for the 
specific country.  Table 6.2 outlines the calibration targets for each country. A quick glance 
would reveal that the European countries have low shares of short-term unemployment (less than 
30%) while Canada and the United States have high shares of short-term unemployment (greater 
than 50%). 
Table 6.2 Calibration Targets 
Country Data Unemployment Rate Share of Short-Term Unemployment 
Canada  7.12% 63% 
United States 6.80% 52% 
France 8.93% 27% 
Germany (Post-Reform) 6.41% 23% 
Germany (Pre-Reform) 9.35% 17% 
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For clarification, only the complex country models are calibrated; the simple UI models 
are not calibrated to match the unemployment rate and the share of short-term unemployment of 
their respective country. The parameters that calibrate the complex UI model 𝛼 and 𝜆 (job 
separation rate) will be used in the simple UI model. This is done so agents in both models are 
the same in regards to utility preferences, the cost of job search preferences, and the job 
separation rate. Based on our generosity metric formulation, the differences between the simple 
model and the complex model should be the UI policy in place. What follows are the calibration 
results using the net income data and the risk aversion coefficient 𝛾 = 3  (base case). 
Additionally, calibration results for 𝛾 = 1 and 𝛾 = 5 are presented also for use in the sensitivity 
analysis section. The summaries for each country’s calibration results will assume 𝛾 = 3, the 
base case. 
Table 6.3 Canada Calibrations Parameters and Results 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
Normalized Net Wage Rate  1  
Normalized Net Waiting Period Benefits  0.20828 
 
 
Normalized Net Benefits (Min/Max)  0.53447/ 0.64740  
Normalized Net Social Assistance Benefits  0.20828  
EI Qualification Duration (Min/Max)  15.75/ 45.5 weeks  
Waiting Period Duration  2 weeks  
EI Benefit Duration (Min/Max)  17/ 40 weeks  
Social Assistance Duration  Indefinite  𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0358 0.0370 0.0374 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0057 0.0058 0.0057 
 72 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 270.81 1,355.1 14,865.3 
Unemployment Rate  7.12% 7.12% 7.12% 
Share of Short-term Unemployment 63% 63% 63% 
Average Unemployment Duration 13.38 weeks  13.33 weeks 13.36 weeks 
 
 Table 6.3 summarizes key variables and durations of the calibrated model for Canada. 
The conditional transition probabilities between unemployment states were calculated using the 
duration data of the waiting period, EI, and the average time to qualify for EI. The average 
duration for EI qualification was calculated based on the amount of working hours required to 
qualify for the minimum/maximum benefit duration. Assuming a 40-hour workweek (full-time), 
17 weeks is the average work duration to qualify for EI and 45.5 weeks is the average work 
duration to qualify for maximum EI benefits, and duration.  
The calibrated models of Canada produces an unemployment rate of 7.12% and 63% 
share of short-term unemployment, matching the calibration targets. For a risk aversion 
coefficient of 3 (base case), the two parameters that calibrated the model where 𝛼 = 1355.1, and 𝜆 = 0.0058. The job separation rate of 0.0058 corresponds to 172.41 weeks (3.32 years) of 
average employment between two unemployment spells. Additionally, the average duration of 
unemployment, in the base case, was 13.33 weeks.  
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Table 6.4 United States Calibrations Parameters and Results 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
Normalized Net Wage Rate  1  
Normalized Net UI Benefits  0.52179  
Normalized Net Social Assistance Benefits  0.32507  
UI Qualification Duration  26 weeks  
UI (Basic) Benefit Duration  26 weeks  
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Tier 1 Duration 
 20 weeks  
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Tier 2 Duration 
 14 weeks  
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Tier 3 Duration 
  13 weeks  
Total UI Benefit Duration  73 weeks  
Social Assistance Duration  Indefinite  𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0336 0.0341 0.0345 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 450.44 1,279.4 4,970.7 
Unemployment Rate  6.80% 6.80% 6.80% 
Share of Short-term Unemployment 52% 52% 52% 
Average Unemployment Duration 17.98 weeks 17.75 weeks 17.75 weeks 
   
 74 
Presented in Table 6.4 are the calibration details for the United States. Based on UI 
eligibility criteria and average income, in order to receive UI benefits, a worker must work for a 
minimum 26 weeks. The US model was calibrated to the unemployment rate and the share of 
short-term unemployment of 6.8% and 52%, respectively. For the base case, the parameters that 
calibrated the model are 𝛼 = 1,279.4, and 𝜆 = 0.0041. The transition probabilities, as usual, were 
calculated using the duration data in the table.  From the job separation rate, the average 
employment duration between two unemployment spells is 243.9 weeks (4.69 years). Also, the 
average unemployment duration for the US model was 17.75 weeks. 
Table 6.5 France Calibrations Parameters and Results 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
Normalized Net Wage Rate  1  
Normalized Net Waiting Period Benefits  0.25317  
Normalized Net UI Benefits (Min/Max)  0.42296/ 0.72023  
Normalized Net Social Assistance Benefits  0.25317  
UI Qualification Duration (Min/Max)  17/ 104 weeks  
Waiting Period Duration  1 week  
UI Benefit Duration (Min/Max)  17/ 104 weeks  
Social Assistance Benefit Duration  Indefinite  𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0523 0.0539 0.0545 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 1,953.9 8,176.9 67,753.2 
Unemployment Rate  8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 
 75 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
Share of Short-term Unemployment 27% 27% 27% 
Average Unemployment Duration 39.23 weeks 38.31 weeks 38.62 weeks 
 
The calibration results for France are detailed in Table 6.5. To qualify for minimum and 
maximum duration of UI benefits, the UI eligibility duration was set at 52 and 104 weeks, 
respectively. The France model was calibrated to the unemployment rate and the share of short-
term unemployment of 8.93% and 27%, respectively. The parameters that calibrated the model 
are 𝛼 = 8,176.9 and 𝜆 = 0.0026. The transition probabilities were calculated using the duration 
data from the table.  From the job separation rate, the average employment duration between two 
unemployment spells is 384.62 weeks (7.01 years). Additionally, the average unemployment 
duration of the calibrated model was 38.31 weeks. 
Table 6.6 Germany (Post-Reform) Calibrations Parameters and Results 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Baseline) 
𝛾 = 5 
Normalized Net Wage Rate  1  
Normalized Net UI Benefits  0.60  
Normalized Net UA/Social Assistance 
Benefits 
 0.35353  
UI Qualification Duration (Min/Max)  52/104 weeks  
UI Duration (Min/Max)  26/ 52 weeks  
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Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Baseline) 
𝛾 = 5 
UA/Social Assistance Benefit Duration  Indefinite  𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0318 0.0320 0.0323 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 3,185.5 10,168.6 43,782.8 
Unemployment Rate 6.41% 6.41% 6.41% 
Share of Short-term Unemployment  23% 23% 23% 
Average Unemployment Duration 46.65 weeks 46.04 weeks X weeks 
 
The calibration details for Germany (post-reform) are outlined in Table 6.6. To qualify 
for UI benefits, 52 weeks of employment were required (UI qualification duration) and 104 
weeks of employment were required to receive the maximum UI benefit duration. The model 
was calibrated to match the unemployment rate and the share of short-term unemployment of 
6.41% and 23%, respectively; the parameters that calibrated the model are 𝛼 = 10,168.6 and 𝜆 = 
0.0015. The transition probabilities, as usual, were calculated using the duration data in the table. 
From the calibrated model, the average employment duration between two unemployment spells 
was 666 weeks (12.81 years), with average unemployment duration being 46.04 weeks. 
 77 
Table 6.7 Germany (Pre-Reform) Calibrations Parameters and Results 
Variable Values 
 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 
(Base Case) 
𝛾 = 5 
Normalized Net Wage Rate  1  
Normalized Net UI Benefits  0.60  
Normalized Net UA Benefits  0.53  
UI Qualification Duration (Min/Max)  52/ 104 weeks  
UI Benefit Duration (Min/Max)   26/52 weeks  
UA Benefit Duration  Indefinite  𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0545 0.0545 0.0545 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 4,207.9 8,962.3 21,975.2 
Unemployment Rate 9.35% 9.35% 9.35% 
Share of Short-term Unemployment 17% 17% 17% 
Average Unemployment Duration 67.7 weeks 66.38 weeks 65.81 weeks 
 
The calibration details for Germany (pre-reform) are outlined in Table 6.7. The UI 
minimum and maximum qualification duration was set at 52 and 104 weeks, respectively. 
Additionally, transition probabilities were calculated using duration data from the table. The 
model for Germany (pre-reform) was calibrated to match the unemployment rate and the share of 
short-term unemployment of 9.35% and 17%, respectively; the parameters that calibrated the 
model are 𝛼 = 8,962.3 and 𝜆 = 0.0016. From the calibrated model, the average employment 
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duration between two unemployment spells was 625 weeks (12.02 years), with average 
unemployment duration being 66.38 weeks. 
6.6. Results 
This section presents the generosity and efficiency metric results. Main results utilize net 
replacement rates and assume the risk aversion coefficient set at 3 (base case). Following 
sections run comparisons and sensitivity analysis/robustness checks. Comparisons are made to 
see if the rankings of countries are similar across different measures (OECD and PSZ measure). 
A welfare comparison is done between Germany pre and post Hartz reform using common 
calibration parameters. And finally, sensitivity analysis is done to test assumptions and whether 
the use of different risk aversion coefficients alters the results/conclusions of the base case. 
The main results, the generosity and efficiency metric for each country, are presented in 
Table 6.8. The table also shows the consumption equivalent and consumption equivalent ratio 
from the complex model, generosity metric  𝜃 and tax rate τ!   that funds the social insurance 
policies in the simple model, as well as the efficiency metric. Additional outputs can be found in 
Appendix B, which contains information on average time and duration spent in each state, job 
search intensities, and optimal replacement ratios in the benchmark UI system (efficiency 
measure). 
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Table 6.8 Generosity & Efficiency Metric Results 
Variable Values (𝛾 = 3) 
Canada USA France Germany  
Post Reform 
Germany  
Pre Reform 
Consumption Equivalent24 0.6586 0.7811 0.6805 0.7730 0.8048 
Consumption Equivalent 
Ratio 
0.2427 0.3375 0.2956 0.3186 0.4444 
Generosity Metric 𝜃 0.3220 0.4376 0.3812 0.4114 0.5482 
     𝜃 Tax Rate τ!  0.0201 0.0320 0.0382 0.0293 0.0547 
Efficiency Metric25 -14.98% -4.05% -8.69% -4.37% -0.63% 
 
 From general inspection, the results indicate that, in terms of generosity, Germany (pre-
reform) is the most generous country followed by USA, Germany (post-reform), France, and 
Canada.  Germany (pre-reform) has a generosity value 𝜃 of 0.5482 or 54.82%, which is about 
1.25 times more generous than the next generous system USA (43.76%). In terms of values, 
USA, Germany (post-reform), and France were clustered closely together with generosity values 
of 43.76%, 41.14%, and 38.12%, respectively. Canada was ranked last with a generosity value of 
32.2%. Between the most generous system and the least generous system, Germany (pre-reform) 
was 1.7 times more generous that Canada. 
 In terms of average utility, the efficiency metric represents the efficiency loss from 
moving from the benchmark UI system to the realistic system; the benchmark system26 offers UI 
benefits such that it maximises average utility. Germany (post-reform) ranked first with the 
lowest efficiency loss of -0.63% followed by USA with an efficiency loss of -4.05%. The third 
                                                
24  Average period utility converted to consumption equivalent. 
25  The optimal replacement rates in the benchmark model: Canada (65.71%), USA (65.91%), 
France (64.13%), Germany post-reform (65.36%), and Germany pre-reform (65.35%) 
26  The benchmark system is similar in structure to the simplistic model 
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and fourth countries were Germany (post-reform) and France with efficiency loss values of -4.37% 
and -8.69%, respectively. Finally, the country with the highest efficiency loss was Canada with a 
loss of -14.98%. Between the most efficient system and the least efficient system, Germany (pre-
reform) is 14.35 percentage points more efficient than Canada. Rankings based on efficiency are 
identical to the rankings based on generosity. 
6.7. PSZ Generosity Metric and OECD Replacement Ratio Comparisons 
 This section presents the PSZ generosity measure for each country along with OECD net 
replacement rates. The PSZ measure 𝜃!"#27 is created using average utility as the matching 
criterion, similar to Pallage et al. (2013), but with the model framework of this paper. The OECD 
measure, the net replacement rate (𝜃!""), is based on the average unemployment benefits 
(including social assistance) over 60 months of unemployment between two income levels (100% 
AW 28  and 67% AW). The OECD measure used is for a single person with no 
children/dependents. Comparisons are made between the different measures of UI generosity to 
investigate if they show similar results in terms of ranking UI generosity. Table 6.9 summarizes 
the three generosity results. 
                                                
27  The PSZ generosity measure is calculated as the replacement ratio in the simple model such that 
it has the same average period utility as the complex model. The generosity measure in this paper uses 
consumption loss (or utility loss) from moving from employment to unemployment. 
28  Average Wage (AW) is the average income (net & gross) calculated by the OECD for a full time 
worker. This income dataset is also used in this paper. 
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Table 6.9 PSZ Metric and OECD Replacement Ratios 
Variable Values (𝛾 = 3) 
Canada USA France Germany  
Post-Reform 
Germany  
Pre-Reform 
Consumption Equivalent 0.6586 0.7811 0.6805 0.7730 0.8048 
PSZ Measure 𝜃!"#  0.3060 0.4464 0.3768 0.4321 0.5682 
     PSZ Tax Rate τ!"# 0.0216 0.0334 0.0373 0.0326 0.0597 
OECD Measure  𝜃!"" 0.32 0.18 0.53 0.45 0.57* 
Generosity Metric 𝜃  0.3220 0.4376 0.3812 0.4114 0.5482 
Note. *Net Replacement Ratios 𝜃!"" from the OECD are from 2013 except Germany (Pre-Reform), which is from 
2002. The 𝜃!"" accounts for social assistance and is taken for a single person with no children/dependents 
  Using the re-created PSZ measure, the countries ranked from the most generous to the 
least generous are Germany (pre-reform), USA, Germany (post-reform), France, and Canada. 
The rankings are identical to generosity metric  𝜃. Also, the PSZ measure 𝜃!"# show very similar 
values to the generosity metric  𝜃. Overall, the use of the PSZ metric and generosity metric 𝜃 
yields similar conclusions. 
 At first glance, the OECD measure (net replacement ratio) and generosity metric values 
for Canada, Germany pre and post reform are similar to one another while USA and France 
yields different values. It is important to note for comparative purposes that the OECD measure 
is solely based on benefits of from UI and the generosity metric in this paper is calculated using a 
model-based measure; therefore, comparisons should be based on rankings rather than values.  
Under the OECD measure, ranked from the most generous to the least generous are Germany 
(pre-reform), France, Germany (post-reform), Canada, and USA. The OECD rankings differ 
from the base case results of this paper; the main difference is that the United States is ranked 
last with 𝜃!""  of 18% while the country is very generous according to 𝜃 (ranked second highest). 
Also, the OECD ranks France ahead of Germany (post-reform) with a net replacement rate of 53% 
and 45%, respectively; based on the generosity metric  𝜃 it is the opposite with Germany (post-
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reform) 𝜃=41% and France 𝜃=38%. When compared to OECD net replacement rates, the 
generosity metric 𝜃 yields different results in terms of rankings and generosity values; all values 
of 𝜃 are clustered close together. 
6.8. Germany Pre and Post Hartz Reforms: Welfare Comparisons  
A comparison is provided between Germany pre and post Hartz reforms. To properly 
make welfare comparison of a policy change, a common set of calibration parameters (utility 
preferences and job separation rate) is used. The pre and post reform Germany models are 
therefore re-calibrated with identical parameters to their respective unemployment rates and 
share of short-term unemployment. The models are run for the base case (risk aversion of 3) and 
risk aversion of 1. 
Table 6.10 Germany Pre and Post Reform: Common Parameters Results 
Variables Values 
 𝛾 = 1  𝛾 = 3  
Germany Pre-
Reform 
Germany Post-
Reform 
Germany Pre-
Reform 
Germany Post-
Reform 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 3957.6 3957.6 9787.5 9787.5 𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0545 0.0373 0.0545 0.0315 
Unemployment Rate 9.36% 7.60% 9.36% 6.30% 
Share of Short-term 
Unemployment 
17.3% 21.0% 16.4% 23.3% 
Average Unemployment 
Duration 
65.58 weeks 52.28 weeks 69.44 weeks 45.24 weeks 
Consumption Equivalent 0.8574 0.8578 0.8048 0.7764 
Consumption Equivalent Ratio 0.3517 0.2191 0.4443 0.3191 
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Variables Values 
 𝛾 = 1  𝛾 = 3  
Germany Pre-
Reform 
Germany Post-
Reform 
Germany Pre-
Reform 
Germany Post-
Reform 
Generosity Metric 𝜃 0.5501 0.4264 0.5475 0.4122 
       𝜃 Tax Rate τ! 0.0545 0.0353 0.0547 0.0288 
Efficiency Metric +0.16% +0.20% -0.63% -4.30% 
 
The models, with common parameters, calibrate both the pre and post reform models 
within a 20% range of the calibrations targets (unemployment rate and share of short-term 
unemployment). Assuming the base case, the pre-reform period had a consumption equivalent 
value of 80.48% of average income, generosity measure of 54.75%, and efficiency loss value of   
-0.63%. During the post-reform period, the consumption equivalent value is 77.64% of average 
income, generosity measure is 41.22%, and efficiency loss value is -4.30%.  
The Hartz reforms, according to the models (base case), caused a -24.71% change in UI 
generosity and a 3.67 percentage point decrease in UI efficiency with a welfare/consumption 
equivalent drop of 3.53%. Interestingly, for a risk aversion coefficient of one there was a small 
welfare increase (0.047%). That is, depending on the risk aversion coefficient there was either a 
3.53% drop in welfare or 0.047% increase in welfare. Overall, the reforms had the effect of 
decreasing UI generosity, which was intended by the Hartz reforms. 
6.9. Sensitivity Analysis 
6.9.1. Risk Aversion  
 This section presents the generosity and efficiency metrics using different risk aversion 
parameters in the model. This is done to examine if results are consistent with different risk 
aversion coefficients. Table 6.11 shows the generosity metric results for each country with a risk 
aversion of 𝛾 = 1 and 𝛾 = 5; for reference results for 𝛾 = 3 are also included. Similarly, Table 
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6.12 shows the efficient metric results for varying risk aversion coefficients; calibration results 
for 𝛾 = 1 and 𝛾 = 5 are presented in Section 6.5. 
Table 6.11 Generosity Metric for Different Risk Aversions 
Country Generosity Metric (Tax Rate τ!) Values 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 (Base Case) 𝛾 = 5 
Canada  0.4118 (0.0307) 0.3220 (0.0201) 0.2727 (0.0206) 
United States 0.4520 (0.0326) 0.4376 (0.0320) 0.4231 (0.0313) 
France 0.4687 (0.0455) 0.3812 (0.0382) 0.3282 (0.0341) 
Germany Post-Reform 0.4336 (0.0300) 0.4114 (0.0293) 0.3958 (0.0288) 
Germany Pre-Reform 0.5494 (0.0545) 0.5482 (0.0547) 0.5468 (0.0551) 
 
Table 6.12 Consumption Equivalent/Average Period Utility for Different Risk Aversions 
Countries Values 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 (Base Case) 𝛾 = 5 
CE CE Ratio CE CE Ratio CE CE Ratio 
Canada  0.8579 0.1942 0.6586 0.2427 0.4320 0.2341 
United States 0.8747 0.2313 0.7811 0.3375 0.6529 0.3646 
France 0.8402 0.2597 0.6805 0.2956 0.4849 0.2849 
Germany Post-Reform 0.8789 0.2210 0.7730 0.3186 0.6293 0.3426 
Germany Pre-Reform 0.8587 0.3518 0.8048 0.4444 0.7402 0.4805 
Note. CE stands for consumption equivalent 
The most interesting results from varying the risk aversion parameters is its effect on the 
generosity values for Canada and France, more specifically, the UI system that have a mandatory 
waiting period. The generosity values for the other countries (USA, Germany (post-reform), and 
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Germany (pre-reform)) stayed relatively stable over different risk aversion coefficients; declining 
slowly as risk aversion rises. For Canada and France, however, the generosity values decline 
sharply as risk aversion rises. This is due to the fact that there is a mandatory waiting period 
before benefits are paid; the agents in the model are subjected to a sharp drop in 
utility/consumption while waiting for UI benefits. When the risk coefficient is increased the 
agent becomes much more risk averse towards drops in income. For this paper, it is assumed that 
benefits during the waiting period equal the same benefit amount from social assistance. This 
was done so that agents are not punished as severely while waiting for UI benefits29. With the 
risk aversion coefficient set at 1 (natural log utility), France becomes the second most generous 
UI system with all other rankings staying relatively the same.  
Table 6.13 Efficiency Metric for Different Risk Aversions 
Country Efficiency Metric Values 𝛾 = 1 𝛾 = 3 (Base Case) 𝛾 = 5 
Canada  -0.76% -14.98% -39.69% 
United States -0.027% -4.05% -13.00% 
France +0.078% -8.69%  -25.36% 
Germany Post-Reform +0.081% -4.37% -14.17% 
Germany Pre-Reform +0.175% -0.63% -3.41% 
 
The efficiency metric, for all countries, displayed larger efficiency losses as the risk 
aversion coefficient was increased. It would appear that countries with a mandatory waiting 
period (Canada and France) are most affected (higher efficiency loss) by increasing risk aversion. 
This is due to the large drop in utility when an agent enters the waiting period; this effect is 
larger as the risk aversion coefficient rises and hence causes lowers average utility. Interestingly 
                                                
29  Income during the waiting period cannot be zero because of the CRRA utility function. If risk 
coefficient equals one (natural log utility) a value approaching zero goes towards negative infinite. 
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with a low risk aversion coefficient of 1, efficiency values are near zero; Germany (pre-reform), 
Germany (post-reform), and France are slightly more efficient than the benchmark systems.  
6.9.2. United States Model 
This section presents the generosity and efficiency metrics using different policy and 
assumptions for the USA model. First, the USA model is run without any UI benefit extension 
programs (EUC and EB) while holding everything else fixed (UI benefit duration reduced from 
73 weeks to 2630 weeks). Second, the model is run without the inclusion of housing assistance 
benefits in the social assistance benefit calculations31. And finally, the model is run with a 26-
week UI benefit duration and the exclusion of housing assistance benefits in the SA calculations; 
this is done to compare results from Pallage et al. (2008) where the authors find that France is 
three times more generous than the United States. Results are run for a risk aversion coefficient 
of 1 and 3. Table 6.13 and 6.14 summarize the results. 
Table 6.14 United States Results with Different Policy and Assumptions (Risk Aversion=3) 
Variable Values (𝛾 = 3) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension Program (2003-
2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Consumption 
Equivalent 
0.7811 0.3973 0.7396 0.2690 
Consumption 
Equivalent Ratio 
0.3375 0.1167 0.2947 0.0740 
Generosity Metric 𝜃 0.4376 0.1573 0.3859 0.1009 
       𝜃 Tax Rate τ! 0.7811 0.0120 0.0290 0.0082 
                                                
30  The maximum duration of UI benefits was 26 weeks between 2003-2008 
31  In the USA model, housing assistance benefits was included in the calculation for SA The 
reasoning for this is to keep the definition of social assistance consistent between countries since USA, 
for a single person with no dependents, does not offer a housing allowance component in social assistance 
benefits. 
 87 
Variable Values (𝛾 = 3) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension Program (2003-
2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Efficiency Metric -4.05%  -54.94% -6.46% -90.74% 
PSZ Measure 𝜃!"#  0.4464 0.1580 0.4031 0.1074 
     PSZ Tax Rate τ!"# 0.0334 0.0121 0.0319 0.0093 
Note. *This is the main USA result (for reference). **The net replacement ratio for social assistance dropped from 
32.51% to 7.15% 
Table 6.15 United States Results with Different Policy and Assumptions (Risk Aversion=1) 
Variable Values (𝛾 = 1) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension Program (2003-
2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA** 
Consumption 
Equivalent 
0.8747 0.8381 0.8646 0.7906 
Consumption 
Equivalent Ratio 
0.2313 0.1185 0.1872 0.0456 
Generosity Metric 𝜃 0.4520 0.3141 0.4028 0.1865 
       𝜃 Tax Rate τ! 0.0326 0.0232 0.0295 0.0143 
Efficiency Metric -0.03% -1.21% -0.11% -1.55% 
PSZ Measure 𝜃!"#  0.4841 0.2874 0.4464 0.1961 
     PSZ Tax Rate τ!"# 0.0365 0.0204 0.0347 0.0153 
Note. *This is the main USA result (for reference). **The net replacement ratio for social assistance dropped from 
32.51% to 7.15% 
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The exclusion of the EUC Tier 1, 2 and 3 programs from the main model32 reduced UI 
generosity and increased the efficiency loss in the UI system. For a risk aversion coefficient of 
three, UI generosity decreased from 43.76% to 38.59% (11.81% drop), and decreased 10.88% 
for a risk aversion coefficient of one. Additionally, the efficiency loss value changed by -2.41 
and -0.08 percentage points for a risk aversion of three and one, respectively. 
The removal of housing assistance from the calculation of social assistance benefits had a 
drastic effect on UI generosity33. Assuming the benefit extension programs are active, UI 
generosity dropped from 43.76% to 15.73% (-64% change) for a risk aversion coefficient of 
three and dropped from 45.20% to 31.41% (-31% change) for a risk aversion of one when 
housing assistance was removed from the model. The results, assuming no benefit extension 
programs, show a similar percentage change decreases of 74% and 54% for a risk aversion of 
three and one, respectively. The effect is larger with higher risk aversion coefficients since 
agents in the model become more averse to drops in utility since social assistance benefits are 
lower when housing assistance benefits are removed. 
The removal of housing assistance benefits from the model, assuming risk aversion of 
three, makes USA the least generous UI system in the study and aligns the results with the 
OECD generosity rankings (𝜃!"" = 18%). The high UI generosity found in the main results is 
not from the UI program itself but what comes afterwards (social assistance with housing 
assistance). 
In the paper by Pallage et al. (2008), a comparison is made between the USA and France; 
the authors conclude that France is 3.33 times more generous than the United States. For 
comparability, the USA model in this paper is re-run assuming UI benefit duration of 26 weeks 
and that the social assistance does not include housing assistance benefits. Assuming risk 
aversion coefficient of 3, the recreated PSZ measures show that USA and France have a PSZ 
generosity measure of 10.74% and 37.68%, respectively France is 3.5 times more generous than 
the USA (Table 6.9 and 6.13). This matches the results found by Pallage et al. (2008), which 
                                                
32  The main USA model assumes that extended benefits programs are in place and that housing 
assistance is included in the calculation of SA benefits. 
33  Social assistance benefits dropped from 32.5% of working income to 7.15% when housing 
assistance benefits are removed from SA calculations. 
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show that the modeling framework of this paper is capable of producing similar results to Pallage 
et al. (2008).34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34  It is not possible to replicate results due to differences in the methodology. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
7.1. Discussion 
This section summarizes results and findings of this paper. Beginning with the main 
results, the set of generosity results of all countries were much more clustered than expected. The 
range of generosity values for France, Germany (post-reform), and USA were between 38% and 
44%, which would suggest that UI generosity for those countries are relatively the same. In 
terms of rankings, Germany (pre-reform) (54.82%) is most generous followed by USA (43.76%), 
Germany (post-reform) (41.14%), France (38.12%), and Canada (32.2%). When compared to the 
OECD net replacement ratios, USA is ranked very high in terms of generosity. The OECD 
measure ranks USA last, while the main results show the USA has the second highest UI 
generosity.  
The efficiency metric represents the efficiency loss, in terms of average utility, from 
moving from the benchmark UI system to the realistic system; the benchmark system offers UI 
benefits such that it maximises average utility. The main results show that Germany (pre-reform) 
ranked first with the lowest efficiency loss of -0.63% follow by USA (-4.05%), Germany post-
reform (-4.37%), France (-8.69%), and Canada (-14.98%). 
For the United States, housing assistance benefits were included in the calculation of SA 
benefits. This was done so that the definition of social assistance stayed consistent between 
countries; the USA was the only country in the study to not provide a housing allowance 
component in SA benefits (for a single person with no dependents). The USA model was tested 
without the incorporation of housing benefits in SA calculations. The UI generosity for the 
United States dramatically fell by 64%, causing USA to be ranked last behind Canada; USA and 
Canada had generosity values of 15.73% and 32.2%, respectively. The removal of housing 
assistance benefits makes the results more in line with the OECD rankings (USA ranked last by a 
large margin). Finally, the findings suggest that the contributing factor for the high UI generosity 
for the USA, in the main results, is not UI itself but the benefits that come afterwards, social 
assistance with housing assistance benefits. This also highlights the fact that the specification of 
what constitutes unemployment benefits/social assistance can greatly vary generosity results. 
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The PSZ metrics were re-created using the matching criterion of average utility; 
replacement ratio is found in the simple model such that it matches the complex model’s average 
utility (criterion). In this paper, the matching criterion is the ratio of average utility of 
unemployment relative to employment (converted into a consumption equivalent ratio) and it 
represents the utility/consumption loss when moving from employment to unemployment. This 
ratio is investigated since measuring utility/consumption loss may be a better criterion for 
measuring UI generosity than using the average utility across all states. The results show, 
however, that the difference between using either criterion is very small with generosity 
measures being virtually identical. Therefore, this would suggest that the use of average utility, 
or a ratio of average utility of unemployment to employment, does not make a major difference 
in the results.  
As another step, welfare comparison was done between Germany pre and post Hartz 
reforms using common calibration parameters. The models were calibrated within a 20% range 
of calibration targets. Overall, the Hartz reforms decreased UI generosity, which was the main 
purpose of Hartz reforms. The reforms also decreased UI efficiency and caused a 3.53% drop in 
welfare. However, when the risk aversion coefficient was decreased from 3 to 1 there was a 
small welfare increase of 0.047%. 
The sensitivity results revealed that generosity values for UI systems, with a mandatory 
waiting period, were most affected by increasing the risk aversion coefficient. Increasing the 
coefficient of risk aversion considerably dropped generosity values for Canada and France while 
the value for other countries slightly declined. This is due to the fact that agents cannot save and 
agents are essentially ‘punished’ with a high drop in utility before UI benefits can be paid. 
Additionally, efficiently loss increases as risk aversion rises with France and Canada (waiting 
periods) being most affected. 
7.2. Policy 
The main purpose of this study was to create single summary measures of UI generosity 
and efficiency that takes into account different aspects of UI policy and economics conditions. 
These summary measures in turn were used to compare UI policies among different countries 
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along two dimensions (generosity and efficiency). While not the primary objective, there are 
some policy implications that could be made from the results of this paper. 
The base case results (risk aversion coefficient of three) suggest that the more generous 
the UI policy is the more efficiency it is as well.35 This however, would be an incorrect 
interpretation. For example, when UI benefits are increased the generosity metric will increase as 
well.36 Generosity is monotonically increasing with benefit. However, in terms of efficiency 
(utility) when benefits are increased utility will rise to an optimal point than fall. This occurs due 
to the inclusion of taxes within the system. When benefits are past the optimal point, the cost of 
the funding the UI system is too much for agents and utility falls due to high tax rates. The policy 
implications that can be taken from this paper are that the countries with low generosity and 
efficiency (Canada, USA, and France) could increase generosity as to increase efficiency. 
Generosity will have to be increased up to a certain point such that efficiency is close to the 
optimum.  
Overall, policy implications should be taken with a grain of salt, as the objective of this 
study was to compare UI policy based on generosity and efficiency, and not on finding an 
optimum of generosity and efficiency for each country. These policy implications only focus on 
generosity and efficiency. Most likely it is not desirable to increase the generosity of an UI 
system if it causes high moral hazard problems, high unemployment rates, and higher costs37.  
7.3. Limitations and Recommendations 
 This thesis is not without its limitations. This section presents limitations of the utilized 
methodology with possible recommendations for future works. The methodology of this paper 
focuses primarily on the household sector, while ignoring firms and labour markets. It is 
assumed that job offers are given at a fixed wage: job offers are given at an endogenously38 
chosen rate of 𝜆 where agents always accept the job offer.  These assumptions simplify the 
                                                
35  For example, Germany pre reform is the most generous and most efficiency UI system. 
36  Generosity rises when benefits are increased due to two effects. First, average utility while 
unemployed increases as a direct results from the higher benefits. Second, average utility increases due to 
lower job search intensity (dis-utility from job search). The average utility while unemployed increases 
and increases the CE ratio, which in turn increases generosity. 
37  A dollar spent funding the UI system might be better spent on other social welfare programs. 
38  The variable 𝜆 is endogenously chosen/calibrated to match the unemployment rate. 
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model. Ideally, a more complete model would include: a) the firms’ profit maximization problem 
where firms choose the optimal number of job vacancies each period; b) the incorporation of 
wage bargaining; and, c) the option for agents to decline job offers. Additionally, agents in the 
model are not allowed to save. The incorporation of consumption smoothing, via savings, would 
also make the methodology much more complete. Instead of the assumption that waiting period 
benefits equal SA benefits, agents would save a proportion of their income to smooth 
consumption between job loss and UI benefits (i.e. waiting period). The main modification in the 
modeling framework in this paper, of that developed by Pallage et al. (2013), is the omission of 
savings; this also represents the main limitation of this paper. 
Besides the major modeling changes suggested, there are smaller issues that could be 
dealt with in future works. It is assumed that the household unit in the model is a single person 
with no dependents. Future works could model a household assuming an average family unit, i.e. 
one wage earner, spouse (non wage earner), and two children; this would also allow for the 
incorporation of other benefit programs such as family benefits. Additionally, the annual wage is 
set at the average annual income calculated by the OECD. Similarly to the OECD’s net 
replacement ratio studies, it would be interesting to calculate different generosity metrics 
assuming various levels of annual income. For example, one could assume a 67% of average 
income, 100%, of average income, and 167% of average income. This is relevant, as those with 
lower average income would be most affected by the generosity of UI versus those with higher 
income. 
7.4. Conclusions 
The primary goal of this thesis was to provide an alternative way of measuring UI 
generosity and comparing different UI policies. The common approach for measuring UI 
generosity is to calculate a so-called replacement ratio, which is represented as the proportion of 
income received during unemployment relative to prior employment income. The approach in 
this thesis is based on the work of Pallage et al. (2013) but with several modification to simplify 
the model. The findings of this paper show that generosity results for France, USA, Germany 
(post-Hartz reforms) are much closer in terms of UI generosity than what a traditional 
replacement ratio would suggest. Additionally, the specification of what constitute ‘social 
assistance’ can greatly vary results. That is, the United States, with housing assistance included 
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in SA, is the second most generous UI system but without housing assistance benefits, USA is 
ranked last with the next generous system being two times more generous. The models were also 
used to compare UI policy changes between Germany pre and post-Hartz reforms.  In this case, 
the models were capable of capturing unemployment rate drops and share of short-term 
unemployment increases. The findings show that the reforms decreased UI generosity, worsened 
UI efficiency, and caused welfare to either decline or slightly increase depending on the used risk 
aversion coefficient. The secondary goal of the paper was to a use a different matching criterion 
than the one used in Pallage et al. (2013). However, the use of the ratio of utility from 
unemployment to employment as the matching criterion proved to be no different than using 
average lifetime utility as the matching criterion. Overall, although the model in this paper was 
modified from its original form, the findings support the results presented by Pallage et al. (2008) 
and those reported by the OECD. 
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DATA SOURCES 
1) Average Gross and Net Income: Income data was taken from the OECD, specifically the 
OECD Taxing Wages 2015 Report: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933197478 
2) Consumer Price Index (CPI): CPI data was provided by OECD Statistics 
(OECD.StatExtracts): https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=G20_PRICES 
3) Harmonised Unemployment Rate: Unemployment rates were provided by the OECD 
Statistics (OECD.StatExtracts): http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=36324 
4) Unemployment by Duration: Unemployment rates were provided by the OECD Statistics 
(OECD.StatExtracts): https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DUR_D 
5) UI Benefits Data: UI Benefit amounts were taken from official government websites & 
documents. Data was supplemented by OECD Social Insurance Policy Overviews: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-policies.htm 
6) SA Benefits Data: SA Benefit amounts were taken from official government websites & 
documents. Data was supplemented by OECD Social Insurance Policy Overviews: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-policies.htm 
7) Fair Market Rents: Data on Fair Market Rents (For the calculation of USA’s rental assistance 
program allowance; Section 8) were extracted from the U.S Department of Housing and 
Urban Development: http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html 
8) Net Replacement Ratio (OECD): Net replacement ratios used in Section 6.7 for comparisons 
came from the OECD, Directorate For Employment, Labor, and Social Affairs: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm 
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APPENDIX A – DATA 
 Appendix A contains all the data used in the study. This includes the unemployment rate, 
share of short-term unemployment (unemployment lasting a maximum of three months), CPI, 
average net income and net unemployment benefits for all countries. 
A.1 Unemployment Rate and Share of Short-term Unemployment 
Economic variables were taken from the OECD. The harmonized unemployment rate and 
share of short-term unemployment (unemployment lasting a maximum of three months) is 
collected for each year, of the study period, and averaged over the time period to give the 
variables used in the study (Table A.1). 
Table A.1 Unemployment Rate and Share of Short-term Unemployment 
Country Time Period Harmonized 
Unemployment Rate 
Share of Short-term 
Unemployment 
Canada 2003-2013 0.07123 0.63090 
United States 2003-2013 0.06807 0.52158 
Germany (Post-Reform) 2003-2013 0.06415 0.22798 
Germany (Pre-Reform) 2000-2005 0.09357 0.17404 
France 2003-2013 0.08931 0.26548 
 
A.2 Calculation of Average Net Income 
The following tables (Table A.2 to A.5) present the data used to calculate the inflation 
adjusted net average income (of a specific time period). The data was taken from the OECD, and 
is specific to a single worker with no dependents. Table A.5 presents the final net average 
income used in this paper. 
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Table A.2 Consumer Price Index 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CAN N/A N/A N/A 88.2 89.9 91.9 93.7 95.7 98 98.3 100 102.9 104.5 105.5 
USA N/A N/A N/A 88.1 90.2 91.9 93.7 95.2 98.2 98.3 100 102.3 104.6 105.6 
DE  85.2 86.8 88 88.9 90.5 92.2 93.9 96 98.6 98.9 100 102.5 104.7 106.3 
FR N/A N/A N/A 88.1 90.2 91.9 93.7 95.2 98.2 98.3 100 102.3 104.6 105.6 
 
Table A.3 Net Average Income (APW/AW From OECD) 
Count
ry 
Curren
cy 
(2010) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CAN CAD N/A N/A N/A 29,0
00 
29,6
36 
30,2
83 
30,6
44 
3212
9 
32,8
77 
32,9
55 
34,4
59 
35,2
21 
36,3
29 
37,0
74 
USA USD N/A N/A N/A 27,2
73 
27,7
85 
28,5
02 
29,7
65 
31,6
15 
33,2
35 
33,9
66 
34,8
07 
36,1
89 
36,8
38 
36,7
37 
DE EURO 19,5
39 
20,4
07 
20,8
72 
21,0
67 
21,9
93 
22,3
63 
22,5
05 
23,1
95 
23,8
42 
23,8
71 
25,3
74 
26,0
88 
26,6
82 
27,0
75 
FR EURO N/A N/A N/A 20,5
00 
21,0
86 
21,6
61 
22,6
75 
23,4
15 
24,2
50 
24,6
28 
25,0
32 
25,5
82 
26,0
29 
26,3
77 
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Table A.4 Inflation Adjusted (2010 Currency) Net Average Income Over Time 
Count
ry 
Curren
cy 
(2010) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CAN CAD N/A N/A N/A 32,8
79 
32,9
65 
32,9
52 
32,7
04 
33,5
73 
33,5
48 
33,5
25 
34,4
59 
34,2
28 
34,7
65 
35,1
41 
USA USD N/A N/A N/A 32,3
14 
32,0
84 
31,8
10 
32,2
13 
33,2
44 
33,6
72 
34,5
18 
34,8
07 
35,0
67 
34,9
84 
34,3
98 
DE  EURO 22,9
33 
23,5
10 
23,7
18 
23,6
98 
24,3
01 
24,2
55 
23,9
67 
24,1
61 
24,1
80 
24,1
36 
25,3
74 
25,4
52 
25,4
84 
25,4
71 
FR EURO N/A N/A N/A 23,2
69 
23,3
77 
23,5
70 
24,2
00 
24,5
96 
24,6
94 
25,0
54 
25,0
32 
25,0
07 
24,8
85 
24,9
78 
 
Table A.5 Inflation Adjusted Net Average Income 
Country Time Period Currency (2010) Inflation Adjusted Net 
Average Income 
Canada 2003-2013 CAD 33,704 
United States 2003-2013 USD 33,556 
Germany (Post-Reform) 2003-2013 EURO 25,016 
Germany (Pre-Reform) 2000-2005 EURO 23,736 
France 2003-2013 EURO 24,424 
 
A.3 Taxation of Unemployment Benefits 
 This section presents a breakdown of the taxes payable on annualized unemployment 
benefits. The taxes owed are calculated using tax rules from 2010 and assumes the person is 
single with no dependents. Social assistance benefits for all countries are not subject to taxation. 
Additionally, UI benefits from minimum UI entitlement in France are excluded from taxation.  
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Table A.6 Breakdown of Taxes and Contributions Payable on Annualized UI Benefits 
Variables Values 
Canada (Min 
UI entitlement 
Canada (Max 
UI entitlement) 
USA France (Max UI 
Entitlement) 
Currency CAD CAD USA EURO 
Weekly Gross Benefit Amount 365 457 362 375 
Annualized Benefit Amount 23,764 19,003 18,824 19,522 
Federal and Provincial/State 
Taxes  
1,944 990 1315 662 
Social Security Contributions N/A N/A N/A 1,269 
Total Taxes and Contributions 
Payable 
1,944 990 1315 1,931 
Effective Tax Rate 8.18% 5.20% 6.98% 9.89% 
Annualized Net Benefit 
Income 
21,820 18,014 17,509 17,591 
Net Weekly Benefit Amount 420 346 337 338 
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APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 Appendix B contains calibration information and additional outputs not presented in the 
results section. The additional outputs include the average duration and share of time spent in 
each state, and search intensity. Also included are the optimal replacements ratios used in the 
benchmark models (efficiency metric). 
B.1 Canada 
Table B.1 Canada Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working 
with no EI 
entitlement 
7.73% 14.52 N/A 7.76% 14.52 N/A 7.74% 14.52 N/A 
Working 
with 
minimum EI 
entitlement 
12.47% 25.54 N/A 12.5% 25.53 N/A 12.49% 25.53 N/A 
Working 
with 
maximum EI 
entitlement 
72.68% 174.46 N/A 72.61% 173.75 N/A 72.65% 174.14 N/A 
Maximum 
EI 
Entitlement: 
Waiting 
Period  
0.78% 1.87 0.0667 0.79% 1.88 0.0643 0.78% 1.88 0.0636 
Maximum 4.14% 11.36 0.0646 4.41% 12.00 0.0598 4.51% 12.28 0.0579 
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State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
EI 
Entitlement: 
EI Benefits 
Minimum EI 
Entitlement: 
Waiting 
Period  
0.13% 1.85 0.0807 0.13% 1.85 0.0837 0.13% 1.84 0.0842 
Minimum EI 
Entitlement: 
EI Benefits 
0.45% 7.45 0.0801 0.45% 7.36 0.0818 0.45% 7.38 0.0816 
Social 
Assistance 
1.61% 9.75 0.1026 1.35% 7.81 0.1280 1.25% 7.15 0.1399 
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B.2 United States 
Table B.2 United States Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state  
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working 
with no UI 
entitlement 
8.93% 23.60 N/A 9.04% 23.58 N/A 9.04% 23.57 N/A 
Working 
with 
maximum 
UI 
entitlement 
84.26% 246.23 N/A 84.15% 243.05 N/A 84.15% 243.02 N/A 
Maximum 
UI 
Entitlement: 
UI Benefits 
5.24% 15.31 0.0524 5.46% 15.78 0.0504 5.67% 16.38 0.0480 
Social 
Assistance 
1.57% 15.04 0.0665 1.34% 12.41 0.0806 1.13% 10.20 0.0981 
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B.3 France 
Table B.3 France Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working 
with no UI 
entitlement 
3.79% 16.65 N/A 3.88% 16.63 N/A 3.85% 16.64 N/A 
Working 
with 
minimum UI 
entitlement 
15.57% 71.38 N/A 15.87% 71.08 N/A 15.77% 71.19 N/A 
Working 
with 
maximum 
UI 
entitlement 
71.70% 400.02 N/A 71.32% 390.61 N/A 71.46% 393.83 N/A 
Maximum 
UI 
Entitlement: 
Waiting 
Period  
0.18% 1 0.0209 0.18% 1 0.0196 0.18% 1 0.0189 
Maximum 
UI 
Entitlement: 
UI Benefits 
5.77% 32.87 0.0210 6.11% 34.14 0.0199 6.24% 35.03 0.0191 
Minimum 
UI 
0.03% 1 0.0319 0.04% 1 0.0351 0.04% 1 0.0349 
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State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Entitlement: 
Waiting 
Period  
Minimum 
UI 
Entitlement: 
UI Benefits 
0.43% 11.37 0.0321 0.43% 10.97 0.0355 0.42% 10.98 0.0354 
Social 
Assistance 
2.52% 28.69 0.0349 2.17% 23.68  0.0422 2.05% 22.23 0.0450 
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B.4 Germany Post-Reform 
Table B.4 Germany Post-Reform Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent 
in state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent 
in state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent 
in state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working with no 
UI entitlement 
6.65% 48.37 N/A 6.73% 48.33 N/A 6.85% 48.27 N/A 
Working with 
minimum UI 
entitlement 
6.18% 48.37 N/A 6.25% 48.33 N/A 6.35% 48.27 N/A 
Working with 
maximum UI 
entitlement 
80.75% 680.52 N/A 80.60% 671.71 N/A 80.39% 659.64 N/A 
Maximum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
3.10% 26.10 0.0195 3.20% 26.69 0.0186 3.29% 27.03 0.0181 
Minimum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
0.16% 17.11 0.0208 0.16% 17.12 0.0208 0.16% 17.05 0.0210 
Unemployment 
Assistance/Social 
Benefit 
3.16% 42.72 0.0234 3.05% 39.92 0.0251 2.96% 37.54 0.0266 
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B.5 Germany Pre-Reform 
Table B.5 Germany Pre-Reform Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share 
of time 
spent in 
state 
Average 
duration 
spent in 
state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working with 
no UI 
entitlement 
6.67% 48.25 N/A 6.79% 48.18 N/A 6.84% 48.15 N/A 
Working with 
minimum UI 
entitlement 
6.18% 48.25 N/A 6.26% 48.18 N/A 6.33% 48.15 N/A 
Working with 
maximum UI 
entitlement 
77.80% 655.80 N/A 77.57% 643.14 N/A 77.47% 637.62 N/A 
Maximum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
3.57% 30.10 0.0143 3.63% 30.12 0.0142 3.68% 30.32 0.0140 
Minimum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
0.18% 19.06 0.0146 0.19% 19.00 0.0147 0.19% 19.00 0.0147 
Unemployment 
Assistance 
5.61% 66.22 0.0151 5.54% 64.04 0.0156 5.48% 62.50 0.0160 
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B.6 Germany Pre and Post Reforms (Common Calibration Parameters) 
Table B.6 Germany Pre-Reform (Common Calibration Parameters): Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 
Share of 
time spent 
in state 
Average 
duration spent 
in state (Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share of 
time spent 
in state 
Average 
duration spent 
in state (Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working with no UI 
entitlement 
6.87% 48.14 N/A 6.51% 48.34 N/A 
Working with 
minimum UI 
entitlement 
6.35% 48.14 N/A 6.04% 48.34 N/A 
Working with 
maximum UI 
entitlement 
77.43% 635.37 N/A 78.09% 672.75 N/A 
Maximum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
3.62% 29.70 0.0147 3.56% 30.68 0.0136 
Minimum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
0.19% 18.89 0.0150 0.17% 19.22 0.0141 
Unemployment 
Assistance 
5.55% 64.11 0.0156 5.62% 67.10 0.0149 
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Table B.7 Germany Post-Reform (Common Calibration Parameters): Additional Results 
State Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 
Share of 
time spent 
in state 
Average 
duration spent 
in state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Share of 
time spent 
in state 
Average 
duration spent 
in state 
(Weeks) 
Search 
Intensity 
Working with no UI 
entitlement 
7.00% 48.14 N/A 6.73% 48.34 N/A 
Working with 
minimum UI 
entitlement 
6.47% 48.14 N/A 6.25% 48.34 N/A 
Working with 
maximum UI 
entitlement 
78.93% 635.37 N/A 80.72% 672.75 N/A 
Maximum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
3.43% 27.60 0.0173 3.18% 26.46 0.0189 
Minimum UI 
Entitlement: UI 
Benefits 
0.18% 17.78 0.0185 0.16% 17.00 0.0211 
Unemployment 
Assistance/Social 
Benefit 
3.99% 48.30 0.0207 2.97% 39.12 0.0256 
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B.7 United States Sensitivity 
Table B.8 United States Sensitivity: Calibration Results (Risk Aversion=1) 
Variables Values  (Risk Aversion=1) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension 
Program (2003-2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in 
SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA 
Normalized Net Wage Rate 1 1 1 1 
Normalized Net UI Benefits 0.52179 0.52179 0.52179 0.52179 
Normalized Net Social 
Assistance Benefits 
0.32507 0.07152 0.32507 0.07152 
UI Qualification Duration 26 weeks 26 weeks 26 weeks 26 weeks 
UI (Basic) Benefit Duration 26 weeks 26 weeks 26 weeks 26 weeks 
Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation Tier 1 Duration 
20 weeks 20 weeks N/A N/A 
Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation Tier 2 Duration 
14 weeks 14 weeks N/A N/A 
Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation Tier 3 Duration 
 13 weeks  13 weeks N/A N/A 
Total UI Benefit Duration 73 weeks 73 weeks 26 weeks 26 weeks 
Social Assistance Duration Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite 𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0336 0.0310 0.0310 0.0245 
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Variables Values  (Risk Aversion=1) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension 
Program (2003-2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in 
SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.042 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 450.4 658.3 518.4 956.3 
Unemployment Rate  6.80% 6.80% 6.80% 6.80% 
Share of Short-term 
Unemployment 
52% 52% 52% 52% 
Average Unemployment 
Duration 
17.98 weeks 17.74 weeks 17.81 weeks 17.27 weeks 
Note. *This is the main USA result (for reference) 
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Table B.9 United States Sensitivity: Calibration Results (Risk Aversion=3) 
Variables Values  (Risk Aversion=3) 
Benefit Extension Program (2008-
2013) 
No Benefit Extension 
Program (2003-2007) 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
included in 
SA 
Housing 
Assistance 
excluded in 
SA 𝜏             Tax Rate 0.0341 0.0327 0.0313 0.0253 𝜆             Job Separation Rate 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0043 𝛼            Cost Function Scalar 1,279.4 12,331 1,744.7 30,243 
Unemployment Rate  6.80% 6.80% 6.80% 6.80% 
Share of Short-term 
Unemployment 
52% 52% 52% 52% 
Average Unemployment 
Duration 
17.75 weeks 17.99 weeks 17.45 weeks 17.13 weeks 
Note. *This is the main USA result (for reference). 
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Table B.10 United States Sensitivity: Benefit Extension Programs Active 
State Benefit Extension Program (2008-2013) 
Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA* 
Housing Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Working 
with no 
UI 
entitlemen
t 
8.93% 23.60 N/A 9.04% 23.57 N/A 9.04% 23.58 N/A 8.93% 23.61 N/A 
Working 
with 
maximum 
UI 
entitlemen
t 
84.26
% 
246.2
3 
N/A 84.15
% 
242.9
8 
N/A 84.15
% 
243.0
5 
N/A 84.27
% 
246.4
3 
N/A 
Maximum 
UI 
Entitleme
nt: UI 
Benefits 
5.24% 15.31 0.052
4 
5.54% 15.98 0.049
5 
5.46% 15.78 0.050
4 
5.91% 17.29 0.044
7 
Social 
Assistanc
e 
1.57% 15.04 0.066
5 
1.27% 11.62 0.086
1 
1.34% 12.41 0.080
6 
0.89% 7.86 0.127
2 
Note. *This is the main USA result (for reference) 
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Table B.11 United States Sensitivity: No Benefit Extension Programs 
State No Benefit Extension Programs (2003-2007) 
Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA 
Housing Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Housing Assistance 
included in SA 
Housing Assistance 
excluded in SA 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Share of tim
e spent in state 
A
verage duration spent in 
state (W
eeks) 
Search Intensity 
Working 
with no 
UI 
entitlemen
t 
9.01% 23.58 N/A 9.26% 23.51 N/A 9.18% 23.54 N/A 9.33% 23.50 N/A 
Working 
with 
maximum 
UI 
entitlemen
t 
84.18
% 
243.9
1 
N/A 83.93
% 
236.5
8 
N/A 84.01
% 
238.9
2 
N/A 83.86
% 
234.6
2 
N/A 
Maximum 
UI 
Entitleme
nt: UI 
Benefits 
3.90% 11.29 0.052
1 
4.11% 11.59 0.049
7 
4.06% 11.53 0.050
2 
4.30% 12.02 0.046
5 
Social 
Assistanc
e 
2.91% 16.27 0.061
5 
2.69% 14.22 0.070
3 
2.75% 14.74 0.067
8 
2.51% 12.71 0.078
7 
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B.8 Efficiency Measure: Optimal UI Benefits in Benchmark Models 
Table B.12 Optimal UI Benefits in Benchmark Models: Main Results 
Country Replacement Ratios in Benchmark System 
Risk Aversion=1 Risk Aversion=3 Risk Aversion=5 
Canada 0.5389 0.6571 0.6937 
United States 0.5173 0.6597 0.7180 
France 0.6139 0.6413 0.6830 
Germany (Post-Reform) 0.5029 0.6536 0.7295 
Germany (Pre-Reform) 0.5600 0.6535 0.7239 
Germany (Post-Reform): Common Parameters 0.5604 0.6538 N/A 
Germany (Pre-Reform): Common Parameters 0.5604 0.6538 N/A 
USA (No HA) 0.5918 0.6174 N/A 
USA (No EB/EUC) 0.5346 0.6617 N/A 
USA (No HA and NO EB/EUC) 0.7075 0.6264 N/A 
Note. No HA stands for housing assistance omitted from social assistance calculation. No EB/EUC means no benefit 
extensions programs are active (Extended Benefits or Emergency Unemployment Compensation). 
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APPENDIX C – ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 Appendix C contains tables or information omitted from the main paper. 
C.1 Canada’s EI Benefit Duration 
This section contains information regarding the calculation of Canada’s EI benefit 
duration. Canada’s EI Benefit duration is based on the regional unemployment rate and number 
of insured work hours in the qualifying period; this relationship is shown in Table C.1. 
Table C.1 EI Benefit Duration Calculation 
Insured 
Hours of 
Work  
 
Regional Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
6% 
and 
under  
Over 
6% to 
7%  
Over 
7% to 
8%  
Over 
8% to 
9%  
Over 
9% to 
10%  
Over 
10% to 
11%  
Over 
11% to 
12%  
Over 
12% to 
13%  
Over 
13% to 
14%  
Over 
14% to 
15%  
Over 
15% to 
16%  
Over 
16%  
420-454  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  26  28  30  32  
455-489  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  24  26  28  30  32  
490-524  0  0  0  0  0  0  23  25  27  29  31  33  
525-559  0  0  0  0  0  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  
560-594  0  0  0  0  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  
595-629  0  0  0  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  
630-664  0  0  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  
665-669  0  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  
700-734  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  
735-769  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  
770-804  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  
805-839  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  
840-874  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  
875-909  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  
910-944  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  
945-979  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  
980-1014  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  
1015-1049  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  
1050-1084  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  
1085-1119  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  
1120-1154  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  
1155-1189  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  
1190-1224  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  
1225-1259  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  
1260-1294  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  
1295-1329  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  
1330-1364  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  
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Insured 
Hours of 
Work  
 
Regional Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
6% 
and 
under  
Over 
6% to 
7%  
Over 
7% to 
8%  
Over 
8% to 
9%  
Over 
9% to 
10%  
Over 
10% to 
11%  
Over 
11% to 
12%  
Over 
12% to 
13%  
Over 
13% to 
14%  
Over 
14% to 
15%  
Over 
15% to 
16%  
Over 
16%  
1365-1399  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  
1400-1434  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  
1435-1469  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  
1470-1504  26  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  45  
1505-1539  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  45  
1540-1574  28  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  45  45  
1575-1609  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  45  45  
1610-1644  30  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  45  45  45  
1645-1679  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  45  45  45  
1680-1714  32  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  45  45  45  45  
1715-1749  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  45  45  45  45  
1750-1784  34  36  38  40  42  44  45  45  45  45  45  45  
1785-1819  35  37  39  41  43  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  
1820 and 
over  
36  38  40  42  44  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
C.2 United States’ UI Program (2010) 
The United States UI policy is modeled using information from 2010. The table below 
shows the policy overview for the unemployment benefits programs in the USA (2010); more 
specifically, State qualification of EUC and EB programs. It should be noted that Table C.2 
differs from the table presented in the United States UI Overview Section, since the table 
presented there is for 2013. 
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Table C.2 United States’ Overview Of UI Program (2010) 
UI Benefits 
Programs 
State Qualification Enacted in 
Michigan? 
(2013) 
Maximum Number 
of Weeks  
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD) 
Regular UI 
Benefits 
(Michigan) 
- Always 26 USD 117 
– USD 
362 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 1 
All States Qualify Yes 20 weeks or 80% 
of the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits  
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 2 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 6 
percent 
Yes 14 weeks or 54% 
of the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 3 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 6 
percent 
Yes 13 weeks or 50% 
of the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Emergency 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
(EUC) – Tier 4 
State must have a total 
unemployment rate of at least 8 
percent 
No 6 weeks or 24% of 
the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
Extended Benefits 
(EB) 
States with a 3-month seasonally 
adjusted UR of 6.5 percent or 
higher, and 110 percent above 
the UR rate for the 
corresponding 3-months period 
in either or both of the two 
preceding calendar years.  
No  13 weeks or 50% 
of the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
In periods of total 
unemployment of 
Same as 
regular 
state UI 
Benefits 
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UI Benefits 
Programs 
State Qualification Enacted in 
Michigan? 
(2013) 
Maximum Number 
of Weeks  
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD) 
 at least 8 percent:  
20 weeks or 80% 
of the regular state 
maximum UI 
duration 
Note. Table adapted from OECD (2015, March). "Social Policies and Data." Benefits and Wages: Country Specific 
Information. Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-
information.htm. 
 
